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Developments in the Application of
Florida's Capital Felony Sentencing Law
JOSEPH A. BOYD, JR.,* and JAMES J. LOGUE**
The authors discuss the Florida capital felony sentencing
law, as amended in response to the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Furman v. Georgia. They ex-
amine developments in the construction and application of the
statutory provisions for sentencing and appellate review, with
a particular emphasis on the "aggravating circumstances" that
the statute provides as standards to guide and control the im-
position of the death sentence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The issues of whether the state may, and whether it should,
inflict the penalty of death continue to be debated with great en-
* Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida; LL.D., Piedmont College; J.D., University of
Miami School of Law.
** Law Clerk to Hon. Joseph A. Boyd, Jr., the Supreme Court of Florida; J.D., Univer-
sity of Florida College of Law; B.A., The Florida State University.
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ergy and emotion.1 From the standpoint of what the United States
Constitution demands or forbids,' the question of whether the
state may ever inflict capital punishment is settled for the time
being. s The legislative question of whether the state should use
such a penalty also is settled, for the time being, in Florida." Con-
stitutional litigation about capital punishment recently has focused
not on whether the state may or should invoke this severe sanc-
tion, but rather on when it may and when it should use the death
penalty, and by what process.5 This article examines developments
in the application and construction of the Florida capital felony
sentencing law,6 with a discussion of sentencing and appellate re-
1. See, e.g., H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1977)
(reflections on the capital punishment controversy in the decade between 1967 and 1977,
during which no executions took place, and a tracing of the development of the constitu-
tional challenge to the death penalty); C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE INEVITABILITY OF
CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974) (opposes reinstatement of the death penalty by arguing that
most state statutes authorizing its use enacted since Furman have not succeeded in circum-
venting the faults Furman condemned); CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (H.
Bedau ed. 1976) (presents the research results of over two dozen scientific inquiries regard-
ing the death penalty); Bedau, The Death Penalty: Social Policy and Social Justice, 1977
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 767 (1978) (advocates abolition of the death penalty by examining the consti-
tutional, ethical, and philosophical underpinnings of this most severe sanction); Black, Re-
flections on Opposing the Penalty of Death, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1978) (states the contem-
porary post-Furman argument against the death penalty); van den Haag, A Response to
Bedau, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 797 (1978) (a brief rejoinder to Bedau's argument for the aboli-
tion of the death penalty).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
("No State .. . shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
The ban on cruel and unusual punishments applies to the states by virtue of its incorpora-
tion into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962).
3. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (the punishment of death does not, under all
circumstances, violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments if not imposed arbitrarily or
capriciously and if the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance).
4. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1979). This section provides that:
A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life
imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becom-
ing eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to determine sentence . . . re-
suits in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death.
See also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1975),
cert. denied, 428 U.S. 912 (1976); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 943 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633
(1977); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Prof-
fitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Alford v. State,
307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 912 (1976).
6. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1979).
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view processes. The article also discusses the "aggravating circum-
stances" set forth in the statute as standards to guide and control
the decision whether to impose the punishment of death.7
A. Pre-Furman Florida Law
Before the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Furman v. Georgia,8 Florida law recognized a number of crimes
as capital, most notably first-degree murder and rape.9 Like many
other American jurisdictions, Florida had divided murder into de-
grees.10 The device of gradation of murder into degrees developed
as a way of ameliorating the harshness of the common law
mandatory penalty of death for murder," which had contributed
to the hesitancy of juries to convict in some cases.' 2 Gradation at-
tempted to differentiate in advance those murders that warranted
the extreme penalty from those that did not.'8
In addition to limiting the use of the death penalty by divid-
ing murder into degrees, pre-Furman Florida law further restricted
its use by providing for discretionary sentencing."' The discretion
was placed in the hands of the jury unless the defendant pleaded
7. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
9. In addition to premeditated murder and rape of a female aged ten years or more,
FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04(1), 794.01 (1971), capital crimes included certain felony murders,
bombing or machine-gunning in public places, homicide caused by a destructive device, car-
nal knowledge and abuse of a female under the age of ten, and kidnapping for ransom. FLA.
STAT. §§ 782.04(1), 790.16(1), 790.161(1), 794.01, 805.02 (1971).
10. 1868 Fla. Laws ch. 1637 (current version at FLA. STAT. 782.04 (1979)).
11. See Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97
U. PA. L. REv. 759 (1949). The now classic division of murder into degrees is widely used in
the United States, but not in England. The 1953 Report of the Royal Commission on Capi-
tal Punishment explained this as due to the-difficulty of defining the most culpable murders.
Bedau, General Introduction to THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 25 (H. Bedau ed. 1964).
But the English Homicide Act of 1957 did attempt a similar distinction by changing the
definitions of murder and manslaughter. H. HART, Murder and the Principles of Punish-
ment: England and the United States, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 54, 60 (1968).
12. Comment, Capital Punishment: Death for Murder Only, 69 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
179, 186 (1978). The "reform" motivation behind degrees of murder was largely nullified in
many jurisdictions by "courts which almost universally have held that the criterion [of pre-
meditation and deliberation] reduces to no more than a requirement of an intent to kill."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
13. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the Court was faced with the con-
tention that the absence of standards to guide the jury's discretion in capital cases violated
due process. The Court responded that "[t]o identify before the fact those circumstances of
criminal homicides ... which call for the death penalty, and to express those characteristics
in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear
to be tasks which are beyond present human ability." 402 U.S. at 204 (Harlan, J.).
14. See 1939 Fla. Laws ch. 19554, § 237A.
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guilty or waived jury trial."5 The jury could recommend mercy for
any reason it found persuasive. There was no provision for appel-
late review of the sentencing decision.16
At the time of the Furman decision, the use of the death pen-
alty in Florida had been suspended, pending the outcome of con-
stitutional litigation on the issue of the permissibility of capital
punishment.
17
15. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1971). That section provided:
A defendant found guilty by a jury of an offense punishable by death shall be
sentenced to death unless the verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by a
majority of the jury. When the verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by a
majority of the jury, the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.
A defendant found guilty by the court of an offense punishable by death on a
plea of guilty or when a jury is waived shall be sentenced by the court to death
or life imprisonment.
16. The supreme court heard appeals as a matter of right from judgments imposing the
death penalty. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) (amended 1972); FL4. STAT. §§ 924.05, .08(1)
(1979). The scope of review in criminal appeals was governed by Florida Appellate Rule 6.16
(1962 Revision):
a. Generally. Upon an appeal by either the state or the defendant the
appellate court shall review all rulings and orders appearing in the appeal record
insofar as it is necessary to do so in order to pass upon the grounds of appeal.
The court shall also review all instructions to which an objection was made and
which are alleged as a ground of appeal, and the sentence when there is an ap-
peal therefrom. The court may also in its discretion, if it deems the interests of
justice to require, review any other things said or done in the cause which appear
in the appeal record, including instructions to the jury. The reception of evi-
dence to which no objection was made shall not be construed to constitute a
ruling by the court.
b. Sufficiency of Evidence. Upon an appeal by the defendant from the
judgment the appellate court shall review the evidence to determine if it is insuf-
ficient to support the judgment where this is a ground of appeal. Upon an appeal
from the judgment by a defendant who has been sentenced to death the appel-
late court shall review the evidence to determine if the interests of justice re-
quire a new trial, whether the insufficiency of the evidence is a ground of appeal
or not.
Prior to Furman, the law in most states did not permit appeal from a sentence that was
within the statutory authority of the court to impose.
To the extent that appellate courts were attuned to the danger of abuse in capi-
tal cases, they could only fight it by fashioning fairer procedure, rules which
primarily applied to the determination of guilt. As a result, judges agonized over
nice questions of procedure, when what really concerned them was the appropri-
ateness of the death sentence.
M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 91
(1973).
17. Ehrhardt and Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Furman: An Exercise in
Futility? 64 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 10, 11 (1973). This suspension was part of a national "mor-
atorium," brought about by the litigation efforts of death penalty opponents. M. MELTSNER,
supra note 16, at 113. The last execution in America before Furman was that of Luis Jose
Monge in Colorado on June 2, 1967. Cowger, Death Penalty: "State-Administered Suicide'?
65 A.B.A.J. 1775 (1979). Florida had not inflicted the penalty of death since May 12, 1964,
[Vol. 34:441
CAPITAL FELONY SENTENCING
B. Furman v. Georgia
The Supreme Court of the United States decided in Furman
v. Georgia's that the sentences of death in the cases under review
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments."9 The Court announced its
judgment in a brief per curiam opinion in which five of its mem-
bers concurred, although nine filed separate opinions. Two of the
justices concluded that capital punishment was unconstitutional
per se.20 The other three members of the majority1 confined their
consideration to death sentences imposed under statutory schemes
in which the death penalty for capital crimes was discretionary
with the sentencing court or jury.2' Justice Douglas emphasized
that unfettered discretion may lead to discrimination by race or by
when Sie Dawson and Emmett C. Blake died in Raiford's electric chair. The St. Petersburg
Times, May 22, 1979, at 1A, col. 6.
18. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
19. The constitutionality of the death penalty had been presented to the Court in vari-
ous ways in the years preceding Furman, but had not been directly confronted, as the Court
avoided the issue "by limiting certiorari to the procedural aspects of capital punishment
trials." Comment, supra note 12, at 182. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968) (imposition of death by jury from which all persons with reservations about capital
punishment were excluded violates due process); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968) (statute allowing juries but not judges to impose death for kidnapping impermissibly
burdens exercise of right to jury trial). For an account of the connection of many such cases
with the organized legal battle against capital punishment, see M. MELTSNER, supra note 16
(discussing Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (exclusion of veniremen with scruples
against capital punishment); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (due process denied
where record did not show guilty plea made with understanding of consequences); and Cole-
man v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22 (1967) (new trial awarded for systematic exclusion of blacks
from grand and petit juries)).
Prior to Furman, the Court had developed only sparsely its interpretation of the eighth
amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (imprisonment for status of being a narcotics addict violates the eighth and four-
teenth amendments); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (denationalization imposed for the
crime of wartime desertion is an impermissible penalty); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1946) (second attempt at electrocution not violative of eighth
amendment because not proposed in order to inflict unnecessary pain); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (fifteen years hard labor in chains with perpetual loss of political
rights excessive punishment for minor defalcation of government funds); In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436 (1890) (electrocution is a permissible method of execution); Wilkerson v. Utah,
99 U.S. 130 (1878) (shooting is a permissible method of execution).
20. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
21. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310
(White, J., concurring).
22. The Court had earlier rejected a constitutional challenge grounded on the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment to death sentences imposed through uncontrolled
jury discretion. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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social class. Justice Stewart focused on the "freakish" way in
which capital sentencing discretion had come to be used and on
the lack of standards to guide the sentencer.2 Justice White was
troubled by the possibility that crimes designated as capital by
statute might not really be capital. With the life-or-death decision
in the hands of the judge or jury, no one knew what a capitally
punishable crime was until the sentencer had passed judgment.
28
Justice White concluded that when infrequently and arbitrarily
applied, as under the statutes before the Court, the death penalty
could not serve the social purposes that justify it."
The practical effect of the Furman decision was not confined
to the cases then before the Court, but resulted in the striking
down of all state death penalty laws having the infirmities held
23. The words of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of the eighth amendment
suggest that it is "cruel and unusual" to apply the death penalty-or any other
penalty-selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of
society, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though
it would not countenance general application of the same penalty across the
board.
408 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
24. These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes
and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petition-
ers are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence
of death has in fact been imposed.
408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
25. Justice White made clear that a mandatory death penalty for a particular category
of crime would present a different question:
The narrower question to which I address myself concerns the constitution-
ality of capital punishment statutes under which (1) the legislature authorizes
the imposition of the death penalty for murder or rape; (2) the legislature does
not itself mandate the penalty in any particular class or kind of case (that is,
legislative will is not frustrated if the penalty is never imposed), but delegates to
judges or juries the decisions as to those cases, if any, in which the penalty will
be utilized; and (3) judges and juries have ordered the death penalty with such
infrequency that the odds are now very much against imposition and execution
of the penalty with respect to any convicted murderer or rapist. It is in this
context that we must consider whether the execution of these petitioners would
violate the Eighth Amendment.
408 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 311-13. "[Tlhe death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the
most atrocious crimes and . . . there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313.
Commentators have focused on the opinions of Justices Stewart and White, in Furman
and in subsequent cases, as they have come to regard the two justices as the pivotal mem-
bers of the Court with regard to death penalty litigation See, e~g.,-Palmer, Two Perspec-
tives on Structuring Discretion: Justices Stewart and White on the Death Penalty, 70 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 194 (1979); Comment, supra note 12.
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crucial in Furman.2 7 Following that decision, the Supreme Court of
Florida held that capital crimes no longer existed in Florida.2
Forty persons whose appeals from judgments imposing the death
penalty were pending before the supreme court were resentenced
to life imprisonment in Anderson v. State.29 Sixty others, whose
appeals had already resulted in affirmance, received the same
treatment as a matter of equal protection. 0
C. The Capital Felony Sentencing Law
Within six months of the Furman decision, the Florida legisla-
ture met in special session and became the first state legislature in
the nation to reinstate capital punishment.,1 The new statute re-
27. See Stewart v. Massachusetts, ,408 U.S. 845 (1972), and companion cases. A number
of death sentences imposed by Florida courts were vacated on the authority of Stewart.
Williams v. Wainwright, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); Hawkins v. Wainwright, 408 U.S. 941 (1972);
Pitts v. Wainwright, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); Boykin v. Florida, 408 U.S. 940 (1972); Johnson v.
Florida, 408 U.S. 939 (1972); Brown v. Florida, 408 U.S. 938 (1972); Anderson v. Florida, 408
U.S. 938 (1972); Paramore v. Florida, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); Thomas v. Florida, 408 U.S. 935
(1972).
28. Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972). The court also held that upon con-
viction for an offense previously termed capital, the defendant would automatically be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment; that the statute providing for a twelve-person jury in capital
cases was of no effect, permitting six-person juries in trials of offenses previously termed
capital; and that crimes previously termed capital could now be charged either by indict-
ment or information. Id. at 502-04.
In State ex rel. Manucy v. Wadsworth, 293 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1974), the court held that
crimes previously deemed capital, committed during the period from the effective date of
Furman (July 24, 1972) to the date of the reintroduction of capital crimes (October 1, 1972)
had to be prosecuted within the two-year limitations period prescribed for all non-capital
offenses. Accord, Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1977). Manucy also held that after the
.reinstatement of "capital crimes," offenses so designated must once again be charged by
indictment of a grand jury. See Lowe v. Stack, 326 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975) (defendant tried for
first-degree murder pursuant to only an information dated November 20, 1972, entitled to
be charged by indictment); Hunter v. State, 358 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). But see
State v. Bell, 372 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1979) (Alderman, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
29. 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972).
30. In re Baker, 267 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1972). See Ehrhardt and Levinson, supra note 17,
at 12. The court decided Anderson on September 8, 1972 and Baker on September 26, 1972.
This direct resentencing by the court shielded the persons involved from the effect of a pre-
Furman enactment, which was to take effect on October 1, 1972 and provided in part:
(3) In the event the death penalty in a capital felony is held to be unconstitu-
tional by the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, the
court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death for a capi-
tal felony shall cause such person to be brought before the court, and the court
shall sentence such person to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole.
1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-118 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 775.082(2) (1979)). Thus, for
-these two groups of condemned prisoners, the possibility-of parole remained open.
31. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS BULL.: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
1975, at 56 (1976). Florida enacted 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-724, which took effect on Decem-
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sponded to the infirmities condemned by the Supreme Court of the
United States. No fewer than thirty-four other states have since
followed Florida's lead by revising or enacting provisions for capi-
tal punishment, at least for the crime of murder.8 2
In Florida there are two capital felonies, murder in the first
degree (premeditated or first-degree felony murder) s and sexual
battery by a person eighteen years of age or older upon a person
eleven years of age or younger.8 ' Capital felonies are punishable by
death or by imprisonment for life without elibigility for parole for
twenty-five years.86
Under Florida's new capital felony sentencing law, a separate
proceeding is held on the issue of which penalty to impose. 6 This
ber 8, 1972.
32. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 31; Comment, supra note 12.
33. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (1979).
34. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(2) (1979). The use or threat of force is not an element of the
offense defined by this subsection. See Harrison v. State, 360 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1978); Banks
v. State, 342 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1976).
35. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1979). The supreme court upheld the provision for
sentences of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 25 years against an eighth
amendment attack, McArthur v. State, 351 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1977); Banks v. State, 342 So.
2d 469 (Fla. 1976), as well as against challenges arguing that the law usurps executive par-
don and parole powers. Owens v. State, 316 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1975); Dorminey v. State, 314
So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1975).
36. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1979). The capital felony sentencing law provides:
(1) SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS ON ISSUE OF PENALTY.-Upon con-
viction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment as authorized by § 775.082.
The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon
as practicable. If, through impossibility or inability, the trial jury is unable to
reconvene for a hearing on the issue of penalty, having determined the guilt of
the accused, the trial judge may summon a special juror or jurnrs as provided in
chapter 913 to determine the issue of the imposition of the penalty. If-the trial
jury has been waived, or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceed-
ing shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose, unless waived
by the defendant. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any mat-
ter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of
the defendant and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (5) and (6). Any such evi-
dence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless
of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defen-
dant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. However,
this subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evi-
dence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Con-
stitution of the State of Florida. The state and the defendant or his counsel shall
be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death.
(2) ADVISORY SENTENCE BY THE JURY.-After hearing all the evi-
dence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court,
based upon the following matters:
[Vol. 34:441
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bifurcated trial, with a guilt-or-innocence phase separate from a
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in
subsection (5);
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the
aggravating circumstances found to exist; and B
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment or death.
(3) FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCE OF
DEATH.-Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the
court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a
sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes a sentence of
death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death
is based as to the facts:
(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in sub-
section (5), and
(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances. In each case in which the court imposes the death
sentence, the determination of the court shall be supported by specific written
findings of fact based upon the circumstances in subsections (5) and (6) and
upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings. If the court does
not make the findings requiring the death sentence, the court shall impose sen-
tence of life imprisonment in accordance with § 775.082.
(4) REVIEW OF JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE.-The judgment of
conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the
Supreme Court of Florida within 60 days after certification by the sentencing
court of the entire record, unless the time is extended for an additional period
not to exceed 30 days by the Supreme Court for good cause shown. Such review
by the Supreme Court shall have priority over all other cases and shall be heard
in accordance with rules promulgated by the supreme court.
(5) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.-Aggravating circumstances
shall be limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of
imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of
a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many
persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or
was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnap-
ping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exer-
cise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calcu-
lated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
justification.-
(6) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.-Mitigating circumstances shall
be the following:
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life-or-death sentencing phase, permits the accused to testify on
matters in mitigation of punishment without giving up the possible
benefits of not testifying at trial on his guilt.
8 7
At the sentencing hearing, evidence may be presented to the
court and jury on "any matter that the court deems relevant to the
nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and shall
include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances enumerated" in the statute.38 Having weighed such ag-
gravating or mitigating circumstances, the jury advises the court
by majority vote whether to sentence the defendant to death or to
life imprisonment.89 If the defendant pleads guilty or is tried by
the judge, or if for any reason the jury that rendered the verdict
cannot reconvene, the "sentencing proceeding shall be conducted
before a jury impaneled for that purpose, unless waived by the
defendant."40
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented
to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
The legislature amended § 921.141 to comply with the requirements of the Furman
decision. Fla. Laws ch. 72-724. That statutory revision superseded another one that would
have taken effect October 1, 1972, which was adopted before the Furman decision. See 1972
Fla. Laws ch. 72-72.
37. Rejecting the argument that a single proceeding in which the jury determines guilt
and makes a binding,, unreviewable decision on whether to grant mercy impermissibly bur-
dens the defendant's right against self-incrimination and opportunity to address the jury in
mitigation of punishment, the United States Supreme Court has held that bifurcated trials
in capital cases are not constitutionally required. Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
38. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1979).
39. Id. § 921.141(2).
40. Id. § 921.141(1). As originally enacted, 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-724 provided for em-
paneling a jury where the defendant pleads guilty or waives jury trial. The supreme court
held that the jury recommendation under such circumstances is a right of the accused,
which can only be waived knowingly and intelligently. Lamadline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17
(Fla. 1974). A provision for empaneling a second jury "because of the inability of one or
more of the jurors to function" was included in the pre-Furman revision of § 921.141, 1972
Fla. Laws ch. 72-72 (superseded by id. ch. 72-724).
In Lee v. State, 294 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1974), the supreme court held that the trial court
could empanel a jury under the new law to conduct a sentencing hearing for a defendant
convicted of a capital felony before the Furman decision. Subsequently, the legislature
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After receiving the recommendation of the jury, the trial court
judge weighs the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and de-
cides how to sentence the defendant." If the decision is for death,
the statute requires the judge to "set forth in writing" his findings
of aggravating circumstances and his conclusion that mitigating
factors are insufficient to outweigh them.42
As under the old law, the supreme court hears appeals from
judgments imposing the death penalty.4" Unlike the old law, appel-
late review extends to the sentence as well as to the judgment of
conviction.44 The statute provides not for an appeal "as of right"
but for "automatic review.
''45
The statute provides two lists of factors relating to the circum-
stances of the capital felony and the character of the defendant,
which the jury and the court must consider in making the sentenc-
ing decision.4" The subsection that enumerates the aggravating cir-
cumstances begins, "Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to
the following: .... ., The subsection introducing the mitigating
factors states, "Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
amended § 921.141(1) to provide for the summoning of a special juror or jurors if "through
impossibility or inability, the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a hearing on the issue of
penalty, having determined the guilt of the accused." 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-379, § 1. Ru-
dolph Valentine Lee was sentenced to death under the old law on June 22, 1972. After the
Furman decision, the trial court reduced his sentence to life imprisonment and the state
appealed. After the adoption of chapter 72-724 and the decision in State v. Dixon, 283 So.
2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974), the district court remanded for a penalty
trial under the new statute. The supreme court approved, holding that because the death
penalty was a possible punishment at the time of the crime, Lee could be sentenced under
the new capital felony sentencing law. But life imprisonment without possibility of parole
for 25 years was a feature of the new law that the court held could not be applied retroac-
tively. The possible penalties for a capital felony at the time of the crime were death and an
ordinary sentence of life imprisonment. Cf. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (applica-
tion of new law to pre-Furman offense not ex post facto; revisions procedural and ameliora-
tive), af'g Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1976).
On remand, Lee was again sentenced to death. ,On appeal, the court took into consider-
ation that most other pre-Furman death sentences were collectively reduced to life in In re
Baker, 267 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1972) and in Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972). See
note 30 supra. The only reason Lee was not included among the Anderson category was that
his lawyer had been diligent in moving to vacate his death sentence immediately after the
Furman decision. As a matter of equal protection, the court reduced Lee's sentence to life
imprisonment. Lee v. State, 340 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1976).
41. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1979).
42. Id.
43. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3); see note 16 supra.
44. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1979).
45. Id.; see Ehrhardt and Levinson, supra note 17, at 19 n.93.
46. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)-(6) (1979).
47. Id. § 921.141(5) (emphasis added).
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.... ,"48 These guidelines"' derive from the Model Penal Code of
the American Law Institute.50 They are designed to guide and con-
trol the exercise of the sentencer's discretion and to limit the im-
position of the death penalty to crimes for which the state's inter-
ests in using it are the most compelling.51
48. Id. § 921.141(6). This difference of language might have appeared insignificant in
view of the provision of subsection (1) that "evidence may be presented as to any matter
that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant
." But see note 110 infra.
Prior to the Furman decision, the legislature provided in 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-72 (su-
perseded by id. ch. 72-724) for bifurcated trials and gave a list of guidelines, but left the
final decision with the jury unless the jury was waived by the defendant and by the state.
That enactment included one aggravating circumstance not included in chapter 72-724: "At
the time the capital felony was commited the defendant also committed another capital
felony." Id. ch. 72-72, § 3(c). It also included a mitigating factor not found in the later
formulation: "The capital felony was committed under circumstances which the defendant
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation of his conduct." Id. § 4(d). The
mitigating circumstance pertaining to age in chapter 72-72 read: "The youth of the defen-
dant at the time of the crime." Id. § 4(4)(h). Chapter 72-724 later expressed the age factor
"The age of the defendant at the time of the crime." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(g) (1979). The
list of aggravating circumstances as now codified includes a factor added by the 1979 Legis-
lature: "The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral justification." Fla. Laws ch. 79-353, § 1
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(i)).
49. In a case in which a state sentencing law provided that the; trial court could reduce
the jury's penalty verdict of death to life imprisonment if it found the verdict not supported
by the weight of the evidence, the United States Supreme Court held that the absence of
standards to guide the jury's exercise of discretion did not deny due process. McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The "standards" feature of this decision seems to have been
disapproved in Furman, at least by the three members of the majority who limited their
expression of views to the sentences imposed in the cases before the Court and did not
discuss the constitutionality of the death sentence per se. The emphasis on the arbitrariness
of the exercise of discretion was the common feature of those opinions. 408 U.S. at 240
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J.,
concurring).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The American Law In-
stitute's Advisory Committee recommended that the Institute eliminate capital punishment
from the model code. The Institute declined to take a position on abolition or retention and
included the section on capital sentencing to provide jurisdictions retaining the death pen-
alty with a model for determining those cases in which to impose it and a procedure for
making the determination. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6, Comment at 65 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959). See M. MELTSNER, supra note 16, at 21-22.
51. The model code's recommended limitations on the use of the death penalty are
based on an approach using flexible standards. This approach may be compared with the
restriction of the death penalty to five enumerated classes of murders in England's Homi-
cide Act of 1957.
The particular classes chosen may appear somewhat curious to American law-
yers, but it is to be remembered that they do not represent an attempt to distin-
guish between murders according to heinousness or moral gravity, but to select
for capital punishment those types- of murder in which the deterrent-effect is
likely to be most powerful.
H. HART, supra note 11, at 60.
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In State v. Dixon,5' the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the
reinstatement of capital punishment. The majority opined that
Furman did not require the complete elimination of discretion in
sentencing for capital crimes.
Thus, if the judicial discretion possible and necessary under
Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., can be shown to be reasonable and
controlled, rather than capricious and discriminatory, the test of
Furman v. Georgia ... has been met. What new test the Su-
preme Court of the United States might develop at a later date,
it is not for this Court to suggest.53
In rejecting the suggestion that crimes most warranting the
death penalty can be defined with specificity before the fact, Jus-
tice Adkins reasoned:
Death is a unique punishment in its finality and in its total
rejection of the possibility of rehabilitation. It is proper, there-
fore, that the Legislature has chosen to reserve its application to
only the most aggravated and unmitigated of most serious
crimes. In so doing, the Legislature has also recognized the in-
ability of man to predict the myriad tortuous paths which crimi-
nality can choose to follow. If such a prediction could be made,
the Legislature could have merely programmed a judicial com-
puter with all of the possible aggravating factors and all of the
possible mitigating factors included-with ranges of possible im-
pact of each-and provided for the imposition of death under
certain circumstances, and for the imposition of a life sentence
under other circumstances. However, such a computer could
never be fully programmed for every possible situation, and
computer justice is, therefore, an impossibility. The Legislature
has, instead, provided a system whereby the possible aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances are defined, but where the
weighing process is left to the carefully scrutinized judgment of
jurors and judges.
54
The court noted that a number of procedural steps or safe-
guards stand between conviction of "a most serious crime" and the
52. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974). The court again upheld
the statute in Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 912 (1976).
For a discussion of Florida's response to Furman, see Note, Florida's Legislative and Judi-
cial Responses to Furman v. Georgia: An Analysis and Criticism, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 108
(1974); Note, Florida Death Penalty: A Lack of Discretion? 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 723 (1974).
53. 283 So. 2d at 7.
54. Id. Justice Harlan expressed similar views in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971). See note 13 supra.
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imposition of the death penalty.55 Holding a separate proceeding
for sentencing assures the presentation of information at the sen-
tencing phase that "might have been barred or withheld from a
trial on the issue of guilt or innocence."" The rules of evidence are
relaxed, and the defendant may testify in his own behalf on the
question of sentence without the adverse consequences that might
follow from doing so in a unitary proceeding. Even on the issue of
sentence, the defendant cannot be required to testify against him-
self. Cross-examination must be limited to matters the defendant
himself has presented in mitigation. The separate proceeding
gives the jury more information relevant to sentencing than it
would otherwise receive.58 To repose the actual sentencing decision
with the judge guards against decisions based on "the inflamed
emotions of jurors," and the judge's expertise "in the facts of crim-
inality" helps to assure consistent application.59 The requirement
that a sentence of death be justified in writing makes meaningful
appellate review possible. 0 Appellate review itself is the final safe-
guard and
guarantees that the reasons present in one case will reach a sim-
ilar result to that reached under similar circumstances in an-
other case. No longer will one man die and another live on the
basis of race, or a woman live and a man die on the basis of sex.
If a defendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review that
case in light of the other decisions and determine whether or not
the punishment is too great. Thus, the discretion charged in
Furman v. Georgia . . .can be controlled and channeled until
the sentencing process becomes a matter of reasoned judgment
55. 283 So. 2d at 7.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 7-8.
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court invoked its power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure
under article V, section 2(a), of the Florida Constitution, and declared that when a trial
court sentences a capital felon to life imprisonment, such sentence also must be supported
in writing. "[R]equiring these findings by the judge provides an additional safeguard for the
defendant sentenced to death in that it provides a standard for life imprisonment against
which to measure the standard for death established in the defendant's case, and again
avoids the possibility of discriminatory sentences of death." 283 So. 2d at 8. Because judg-
ments in which the sentence is life imprisonment are reviewed by different appellate courts,
however, it is arguable that there is nothing to assure consistency in the sentencing decision
except the conscientiousness of the sentencing judges. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2)
(amended.1980) no longer authorizes the legislature to provide for supreme court review of
judgments imposing life imprisonment. See Kramer, Halpern & Robbins, Constitutional
Law, 1979 Developments in Florida Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 597, 610 (1980).
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rather than an exercise in discretion at all."
As noted above, Florida was the first state to reinstate capital
punishment after Furman, and a large number of other states soon
followed.62  Thus, the predominant question among state law-
makers, constitutional lawyers, and commentators was how those
post-Furman enactments would fare when considered by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. Florida's law was scrutinized on
certiorari review of a decision by the Supreme Court of Florida
that affirmed a capital felony judgment and sentence of death."
D. Proffitt v. Florida and Its Companion Cases
On July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States up-
held the Florida capital felony sentencing law in Proffitt v. Flor-
ida." The Court held that the new statutory provisions had reme-
died the deficiencies condemned by Furman and that the death
sentence imposed did not violate the eighth amendment. In
rejecting the petitioner's contention that the imposition of the
death penalty violates the eighth amendment under all circum-
stances," the Court referred to Gregg v. Georgia,6" one of four
other cases that challenged death penalty statutes and were de-
cided on the same day as Proffitt61 In Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek v.
Texas" there were two plurality opinions, each joined in by three
justices.e9
In Gregg, the plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens explained that the basic concern of the eighth amend-
61. 283 So. 2d at 10.
62. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS BULL., supra note 31.
63. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 247 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
66. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
67. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The
Stewart plurality considered per se constitutionality in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168, while Justice
White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, rejected petitioner's per se
challenge for the reasons stated in his dissent in Roberts v. Louisiana. 428 U.S. at 226
(White, J., dissenting).
68. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
69. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 158 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); id. at
207 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 244 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); id. at 260 (White,
J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. at 265 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); id. at 277 (White, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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ment is to protect human dignity, requiring that punishments not
be excessive.7 0 Therefore, punishment should not involve unneces-
sary infliction of pain, nor be grossly out of proportion to the crime
for which it is imposed.7 1 The plurality found support for their
conclusions in the language of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments72 and in the Court's eighth amendment decisions 73 which
they thought indicated a tradition of social acceptance of capital
punishment. They noted that the eighth amendment is not a static
concept, but one based on evolving standards.74 The legislative
response to Furman, however, indicated continued social accept-
ance and endorsement of the death penalty.7 5 The plurality con-
cluded that if a penalty the legislature proposes to use is not cru-
elly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime, courts should not
interfere.
76
Moreover, the plurality argued, the inconclusiveness of the ev-
idence on the deterrent value of capital punishment does not bar
its use, but offers a further reason for deference to the legislative
judgment.77 Furthermore, retribution as a social purpose is not in-
consistent with the dignity of man; in the view of many, human
dignity demands retribution for the most culpable crimes.78 The
Gregg plurality concluded that for the crime of deliberate murder,
"we cannot say that the punishment is invariably disproportionate
to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most ex-
treme of crimes.
'79
After deciding that capital punishment is not unconstitutional
per se, the plurality explained that to remedy the problems identi-
fied in Furman, the statutory sentencing procedure must assure
guided and controlled consideration of information relevant to the
70. 428 U.S. at 173 (1976) (plurality opinion).
71. Id.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, . . .nor shall any per-
son be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
...nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
Id. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "No State shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ..
73. See note 19 supra.
74. 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion).
75. Id. at 179-80.
76. Id. at 175.
77. Id. at 185-86.
78. Id. at 183-84.
79. Id. at 187.
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sentencing decision. 80 The Georgia statute met the test by requir-
ing the jury to focus on the circumstances of the crime and the
character of the defendant."1
80. The Court concluded:
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death
not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a-carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate in-
formation and guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met by
a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing au-
thority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and
provided with standards to guide its use of the information.
Id. at 195.
81. According to the opinion:
The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were being
condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under the procedures before
the Court in that case, sentencing authorities were not directed to give attention
to the nature or circumstances of the crime committed or to the character or
record of the defendant. Left unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a
way that could only be called freakish. The new Georgia sentencing procedures,
by contrast, focus the jury's attention on the particularized characteristics of the
individual defendant. While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory aggra-
vating factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this way the jury's
discretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the
death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines. In addi-
tion, the review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional
assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not pre-
sent to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here.
Id. at 206-07.
In an early decision of the Supreme Court of Florida under the new law, some language
appeared that seemed inconsistent with the Furman concerns about unfettered discretion to
effect mercy:
The law does not require that capital punishment be imposed in every convic-
tion in which a particular state of facts occur. The statute properly allows some
discretion, but requires that this discretion be reasonable and controlled. No de-
fendant can be sentenced to capital punishment unless the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating factors. However, this does not mean that in every in-
stance under a set state of facts the defendant must suffer capital punishment.
The statute contemplates that the trial jury, the trial judge and this Court
will exercise reasoned judgment as to what factual situations require the imposi-
tion of death and which factual situations can be satisfied by life imprisonment
in light of the totality of the circumstances present in the evidence. Certain fac-
tual situations may warrant the infliction of capital punishment, but, neverthe-
less, would not prevent either the trial jury, the trial judge, or this Court from
exercising reasoned judgment in reducing the sentence to life imprisonment.
Such an exercise of mercy on behalf of the defendant in one case does not pre-
vent the imposition of death by capital punishment in the other case.
Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533, 540 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976).
The Gregg plurality opinion, however, seemed to de-emphasize the concern with arbi-
trary power to grant mercy:
The petitioner next argues that the requirements of Furman are not met
here because the jury has the power to decline to impose the death penalty even
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Likewise, in Proffitt v. Florida82 the plurality said that because
the trial judge had to weigh aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, the statute required a focus on "the circumstances of the
crime and the character of the individual defendant."" The plural-
ity saw appellate review of the sentencing decision as a safeguard
against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, because of the
appellate court's role of assuring consistency."' The existence of
prosecutorial, jury, and executive discretionary stages in the pro-
cess of selecting those who will ultimately suffer the penalty of
death does not render the sentencing arbitrary. The plurality said,
as in Gregg, that the petitioner's argument on this point was
"based on a fundamental misinterpretation of Furman.
'85
In response to the petitioner's argument that Florida's new
statute did not eliminate arbitrariness, because the provisions
enumerating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were
vague and overbroad, the Court referred to some of the early deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of Florida construing these provisions
of the statute." The petitioner also argued that the weighing pro-
cess mandated by the statute would not help to standardize deci-
sions, because the statute did not tell the jury what weight to as-
sign to each factor. The Court said:
While these questions and decisions may be hard, they re-
quire no more line drawing than is commonly required of a
factfinder in a lawsuit. For example, juries have traditionally
evaluated the validity of defenses such as insanity or reduced
capacity, both of which involve the same considerations as some
of the above-mentioned mitigating circumstances. While the va-
if it finds that one or more statutory aggravating circumstances are present in
the case. This contention misinterprets Furman. Moreover, it ignores the role of
the Supreme Court of Georgia which reviews each death sentence to determine
whether it is proportional to other sentences imposed for similar crimes. Since
the proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the
decision to inflict the penalty, the isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy does
not render unconstitutional death sentences imposed on defendants who were
sentenced under a system that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness
or caprice.
428 U.S. at 203 (citation omitted). For further discussion of this point, see England, Capital
Punishment in the Light of Constitutional Evolution: An Analysis of Distinctions Between
Furman and Gregg, 52 NorsE DAME LAW. 596 (1977); Note, Furman to Gregg: The Judicial
and Legislative History, 22 How. L.J. 53 (1979).
82. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
83. Id. at 251 (plurality opinion).
84. Id. at 253.
85. Id. at 254.
86. Id. at 255-56.
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rious factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities do
not have numerical weights assigned to them, the requirements
of Furman are satisfied when the sentencing authority's discre-
tion is guided and channeled by requiring examination of spe-
cific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the
death penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capri-
ciousness in its imposition."7
Finally, the Court reiterated its belief that there was an im-
portant safeguard in the appellate review process, "designed to as-
sure that the death penalty will not be imposed on a capriciously
selected group of convicted defendants. The Supreme Court of
Florida reviews each death sentence to ensure that similar results
are reached in similar cases."88 The Florida appellate review pro-
cess had thus incorporated into law the "type of proportionality
review mandated by the Georgia statute."89
Since the Court's validation of the constitutionality of the
Florida capital felony sentencing law, prosecution for capital of-
fenses and the imposition of death sentences have continued
apace. There are now approximately one hundred and fifty persons
under sentence of death in Florida. The process initiated by the
reinstatement of capital punishment in 1972 came to a culmination
with the electrocution of John Spenkelink on May 25, 1979.90
II. THE SENTENCING PROCESS
The common features of the death penalty laws upheld in
Proffitt, Jurek, and Gregg include the following: a sentencing pro-
ceeding for the receipt of evidence and argument relative to sen-
87. Id. at 257-58.
88. Id. at 258 (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 259.
In the third case decided on July 2, 1976, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), the Court
upheld the Texas capital punishment laws, holding that both standards of aggravation and
opportunity for individualized consideration were sufficiently present. The other two deci-
sions rendered that day, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), struck down provisions for a mandatory sentence of death
for a specified crime. In both of these cases the plurality of Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens were joined in their judgment by Justices Brennan and Marshall. The plurality said
that the failure to allow for individualized consideration of the appropriate punishment,
even for a most serious crime, violated the eighth amendment. See generally Comment,
First-Degree Murder Statutes and Capital Sentencing Procedures: An Analysis and Com-
parison of Statutory Systems for the Imposition of the Death Penalty in Georgia, Florida,
Texas, and Louisiana, 24 Loy. L. Rv. 709 (1978).
90. St. Petersburg Times, May 26, 1979, at 1A, col. 5. Gary Gilmore was executed in
Utah on January 17, 1977. Jessee Bishop died in Nevada on October 22, 1979. Cowger,
supra note 17.
19801
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tence; written standards, either in the form of definitions of aggra-
vated murders or guidelines for determining the aggravation of
capital crimes; a requirement of written findings by the sentencer;
a method or standards for focusing attention on mitigating circum-
stances; and appellate review of the sentence of death. Under the
Florida law, however, the jury sentencing proceeding need not in-
variably take place. The defendant may waive the jury's advisory
sentence, if the waiver is knowingly and intelligently made.9 1 The
defendant's waiver, however, does not determine the matter; it
merely gives the trial judge discretion either to dispense with the
jury hearing or to require it.e"
The Florida statute provides that the "separate sentencing
proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sen-
tenced to death or life imprisonment" 3 is to be "conducted by the
trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable."" At this
proceeding, the parties may present evidence on "any matter that
the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the char-
acter of the defendant."95 The statute declares that the evidence
presented "shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (5) and
(6)." ' The court may receive any evidence that "the court deems
to have probative value . . . , regardless of its admissibility under
the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is ac-
corded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. 9 7 Fi-
nally, subsection (1) provides that the state and the defendant or
counsel shall be permitted to present an argument for or against
91. Holmes v. State, 374 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1979); Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658
(Fla. 1978).
The jury recommendation is an essential right.
Both the trial judge, before imposing a sentence, and this Court, when reviewing
the propriety of the death sentence, consider as a factor the advisory opinion of
the sentencing jury. In some instances it could be a critical factor in determining
whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.
Lamadline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1974).
92. State v. Carr, 336 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1976). The Georgia statute providing that death
may not be imposed for a capital crime unless the jury finds at least one aggravating circum-
stance also provides that "[tihe provisions of this section shall not affect a sentence when
the case is tried without a jury or when the judge accepts a plea of guilty." GA. CODE § 26-
3102 (1978).
93. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1979); see note 36 supra.
94. Id. The proceeding may be held before a second jury empaneled especially for the
purpose. See note 40 supra.





the sentence of death.9 8
As for the advisory verdict on sentence, the statute directs:
After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and
render an advisory sentence to the court, based upon the follow-
ing matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as
enumerated in subsection (5);
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist
which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist;
and
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant
should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death."9
The jury arrives at its recommendation by majority vote.100 The
trial judge is free to reject the jury's recommendation, but only
"after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances."101
But the statute does not offer any guidance on the degree of aggra-
vation necessary for a death sentence.
In State v. Dixon,102 the court began to resolve some of the
unanswered questions about the statute:
The aggravating circumstances of Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6),
F.S.A., actually define those crimes-when read in conjunction
with Fla. Stat. §§ 782.04(1) and 794.01(1), F.S.A.-to which the
98. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.780 was promulgated to create a uniform pro-
cedure for sentencing proceedings in capital cases, Re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
343 So. 2d 1247, 1263 (Fla. 1977), and provides as follows:
(a) In all proceedings based upon Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975),
the state and defendant will be permitted to present evidence of an aggravating
or mitigating nature, consistent with the requirements of the statute. Each side
will be permitted to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the other side.
The state will present evidence first.
(b) The trial judge shall permit rebuttal testimony.
(c) Both the state and the defendant will be given an equal opportunity
for argument, each being allowed one argument. The state will present argument
first.
See also Yetter, The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure: 1977 Amendments, 5 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 243, 305-06 (1977).
99. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1979).
100. Allowing the jury recommendation to be arrived at by majority vote in the sen-
tencing phase of a capital case does not violate constitutional rights to trial by jury. Alvord
v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976). The court in Alvord
cited Watson v. State, 190 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1967), a pre-Furman case on the permissibility of
a binding recommendation of mercy by majority vote. In Waeson, the court reasoned that a
requirement of unanimity would make it more difficult for the defendant to get a recom-
mendation of mercy. Id. at 166.
101. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1979).
102. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
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death penalty is applicable in the absence of mitigating circum-
stances. As such, they must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt before being considered by judge or jury.
When one or more of the aggravating circumstances is
found, death is presumed to be the proper sentence unless it or
they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating circum-
stances provided in Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7), F.S.A. All evidence of
mitigating circumstances may be considered by the judge or
jury. 10
The aggravating and the mitigating circumstances serve differ-
ent purposes. By codifying the aggravating circumstances, which
define the crimes to which the death penalty applies in the absence
of mitigating circumstances, the legislature has attempted to pro-
vide "clearly articulated standards of culpability,' ' 10 in response to
one of the problems perceived by the Furman majority.'015 The
mitigating circumstances, on the other hand, focus attention on the
facts and surrounding circumstances of the crime and the charac-
ter and background of the defendant. Punishment of certain con-
duct, however it is defined, is not the only public policy aim of the
criminal justice system.'06 Whether the objective of capital punish-
ment is utilitarian (i.e., based on deterrence) or moralistic (i.e.,
based on retribution), there are both utilitarian and morally based
limitations on its use. 0 7 The legislature, therefore, focuses the sen-
tencer's decision on consideration of factors suggesting that the
capital felony in question should not be punished as severely as
other such felonies. In the sentencing process, using standards of
culpability on the one hand and mitigating factors on the other,
the values of consistency and individualization remain in constant
tension with one another.
103. Id. at 9.
104. See Palmer, supra note 26. The author posits that Justice Stewart's chief concern
is with individualizing consideration of the sentence of death, while Justice White's is with
clearly defining the conduct that is to be so punished.
105. See notes 8 & 18 and accompanying text supra.
106. [I]n relation to any social institution, after stating what general aim or value
its maintenance fosters we should enquire whether there are any and if so what
principles limiting the unqualified pursuit of that aim or value. Just because the
pursuit of any single social aim always has its restrictive qualifier, our main so-
cial institutions always possess a plurality of features which can only be under-
stood as a compromise between partly discrepant principles.
H. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBIL-
iTy 10 (1968).
107. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
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A. Evidence and Argument
Under Florida's capital felony sentencing law, all evidence
that the court considers relevant to the sentencing question is ad-
missible. 08 The rules of evidence are relaxed and the court's ap-
proach to what is relevant should be broad rather than narrow.0 9
Because aggravating and mitigating factors serve different pur-
poses, however, the question of "relevance" to the sentencing deci-
sion differs in the two contexts." 0 Evidence disfavoring the defen-
dant's claim that he should be spared the extreme penalty must
relate to one of the statutory aggravating circumstances."' It is er-
ror to allow the state, in seeking a sentence of death, to present to
the jury evidence or argument not relevant to a statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance.'" Such evidence may tend to prejudice the de-
fendant or inflame the jury with improper considerations.""
In making findings, the trial judge may consider information
relevant to sentencing that neither party has sought to put before
the jury." 4 All information considered, however, must be furnished
to the defendant, and he must have an opportunity to explain, re-
but, or deny it." e The Supreme Court of the United States an-
108. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1979). See, e.g., Swan v. State, 322 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1975)
(trial court properly considered testimony by a psychologist, a psychiatric report from a
prior criminal hearing, and a pre-sentence investigation report).
109. Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976).
110. The plurality in Proffitt noted the different introductory language in subsections
(5) and (6) of section 921.141 and expressed confidence that this indicated that the stan-
dards of aggravation would not be arbitrarily expanded. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250
n.8, 256 n.14 (1976).
111. See, e.g., Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1977); Meeks v. State, 339 So. 2d
186 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978).
112. In Elledge, the court held inadmissible, at a sentencing trial for a murder convic-
tion, testimony and prosecutorial argument concerning the defendant's confession to a sub-
sequent murder for which he had not yet been convicted. The Supreme Court of Florida
held that admission of the evidenice was not harmless error because it related to a nonstatu-
tory aggravating factor and might have influenced the jury's weighing process. 346 So. 2d at
1002-03. In Meeks, the court held that comments by the prosecutor regarding contempora-
neous felony convictions were erroneously allowed, but that the error was harmless because
the same jury that heard the comments had returned the verdicts commented upon. 339 So.
2d at 190.
113. The aggravating factors in the statute define the crimes for which death is appro-
priate. State v. Dixon, 383 So. 2d at 9. Allowing the jury or the judge to add to the list
invades the province of the legislature. Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1979). The
standards of culpability and responsibility are matters of legislative policy. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (White, J., concurring); Comment, supra note 89.
114. See, e.g., Sawyer v. State, 313 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911
(1976).
115. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
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nounced this principle in Gardner v. Florida,"' on review of a
judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida,' 7 in the context of
trial court use of pre-sentence investigations." 8
In Gardner v. Florida, the Court held that a sentence of death
imposed in partial reliance on information in the confidential por-
tion of a pre-sentence investigation report, which the defendant
had no opportunity to explain, rebut, or deny, violated due pro-
cess. ' The Court reasoned that in a death penalty case, the need
for reliability in considering the facts of the crime and the charac-
teristics of the defendant compelled the disclosure of all informa-
tion. Despite recognizing that the principle of guided and con-
trolled discretion requires as much relevant information as
possible, the Court nevertheless felt that the quality of the deci-
116. Id. at 362 (plurality opinion); id. at 363 (White, J., concurring).
117. Gardner v. State, 313 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1975), cert. granted, 428 U.S. 908 (1976).
The grant of certiorari was limited to the following question:
Whether nondisclosure of a 'confidential' portion of a pre-sentence investigation
report to a defendant convicted of a capital crime constitutes a denial of the
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States, and of the right to a fair hearing
as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in a
case where the trial judge declines to accept a jury recommendation of a life
sentence and instead imposes the death sentence partially on the basis of the
pre-sentence report?
428 U.S. at 909.
118. Pre-sentence investigations, to be considered when a judge has discretion in sen-
tencing, are authorized by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.710, which provides:
In all cases in which the court has discretion as to what sentence may be
imposed, the court may refer the case to the probation and parole commission
for investigation and recommendation. No sentence or sentences other than pro-
bation shall be imposed on any defendant found guilty of a first felony offense or
found guilty of a felony while under the age of 18 years, until after such investi-
gation has first been made and the recommendations of the commission received
and considered by the sentencing judge.
Section 921.231 of the Florida Statutes (1979) governs the conduct of the investigation.
Thus, in some cases the court must order an investigation and consider its results. Under
the procedural rule, the court may disclose the reported findings to the parties, and if dis-
closed to one side, the findings must be disclosed to both. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.713(a).
In a capital case, however, where the statute provides that evidence and argument be
heard on the issue of sentence, the court has discretion whether to order a pre-sentence
investigation. Even if the capital felony is the defendant's first felony offense, the pre-sen-
tence investigation is optional because probation is not a possible sentence. See, e.g., Jack-
son v. State, 366 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1978); Hargrave v. State, 366 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1978). Query
whether, if the legislature amended section 921.141 to provide for the consideration of a
court-ordered background investigation, the supreme court would hold the amendment an
invasion of the court's authority over procedure. See generally Huntley v. State, 339 So. 2d
194 (Fla. 1976) (court-ordered pre-sentence investigation is a matter of practice and proce-
dure; legislature cannot require it); Kramer, Halpern & Robbins, supra note 60, at 602-08.
119. 430 U.S. at 351.
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sion improves when both sides have a chance to evaluate and re-
spond to the information."'0 After Gardner v. Florida, the Su-
preme Court of Florida adopted the practice of remanding or
relinquishing jurisdiction over pending appeals so that the trial
court could determine whether the sentence of death was based on
information that the defendant had no opportunity to rebut, ex-
plain, or deny.
1 2'
When evidence of aggravating circumstances is presented, any
evidence reasonably related to one of the enumerated mitigating
factors also must be received at the sentencing hearing. In Miller
v. State, 22 defense counsel asked for a continuance of the sentenc-
ing hearing so that he could present psychiatric testimony on the
statutory mitigating circumstances of emotional disturbance, im-
paired capacity to conform to the law, and lack of appreciation of
criminality. The trial court refused to continue the sentencing
trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held:
The jury was deprived of testimony highly relevant to their eval-
uation of mitigating circumstances-the testimony of the psy-
chiatrists, who had testified during trial, relative to whether
Miller acted under the influence of extreme mental disturbance
(Section 921.141(6)(b)) or whether his ability to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially im-
120. Id. at 359. This holding represents an expression of trust in the adversary process
as the best way to arrive at the truth.
121. E.g., Jacobs v. State, 357 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1978) (after inadequate response to
Gardner order, remanded for specific finding of opportunity to rebut or new sentencing
hearing). On certiorari review of Songer v. State, 322 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1975), the death sen-
tence was vacated and the case remanded for consideration in light of Gardner. Songer v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 952 (1977) (mem.).
A number of capital cases, after affirmance on appeal, were reconsidered in light of the
Gardner decision. Trial court recitation indicating compliance corrected some of these cases.
Others resulted in a reconsideration of sentence after hearing from the defendant. Still
others resulted in vacation of the sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing before
the judge. See, e.g., Dobbert v. State, 375 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1979) (death sentence affirmed
after resentencing on Gardner remand); Harvard v. State, 375 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1977), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 956 (1979) (remanded for new sentencing hearing); Funchess v. State, 367
So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1979), vacating 341 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1976) (confidential portion of pre-
sentence investigation considered); Meeks v. State, 364 So. 2d 461 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 991 (1978) (death sentence affirmed after remand to trial court for Gardner inquiry);
Barclay v. State, 362 So. 2d 657 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978) (death sentence
vacated, remanded for opportunity to rebut); Adams v. State, 355 So. 2d 1205 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 947 (1978) (motion for remand for Gardner inquiry denied); Alford v.
State, 355 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 935 (1978) (death sentence reaf-
firmed after trial court inquiry).
122. 332 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1976).
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paired . . .
The supreme court ordered a new sentencing proceeding, with a
jury and psychiatric testimony." ' Miller stands for the proposition
that all evidence proffered by the defendant and relevant to a stat-
utory mitigating circumstance must be received.
12 5
Not only must all evidence of mitigating circumstances be re-
ceived, but also due process requires that mitigating considerations
not be limited to those given in the statute. In Lockett v. Ohio,2 6
the Supreme Court of the United States vacated a sentence of
death, holding that the sentencing statute violated the eighth and
fourteenth amendments by its failure to allow the consideration of
mitigating factors other than those given in the statute.12 7 The
Ohio statute narrowly limited the factors that the sentencer could
consider as mitigating. As a result, the death penalty was much
akin to a mandatory death provision. The statute, said the plural-
ity, barred the sentencing authority from considering the circum-
stances of the offense and the character and record of the defen-
dant, thus subjecting the defendant to the risk of arbitrary and
capricious selection for death.
128
Even before the Lockett decision, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida had recognized that circumstances other than those listed in
the statute could reasonably influence a jury to recommend or a
judge to impose a life sentence instead of death.129 In Songer v.
State,3 0 the court rejected an argument that the capital felony
sentencing law is unconstitutional under Lockett, referring to cases
in which it had approved trial court consideration of mitigating
circumstances not listed in the statute."' The Supreme Court of
the United States had noted the nonexclusive nature of the statu-
tory list in Proffitt v. Florida,13 2 and the Supreme Court of Florida
123. Id. at 67-68.
124. Id. at 68.
125. Because the jury recommendation is so important under the Florida scheme, it is
reversible error to keep such matters from the jury. Of course, if the jury recommends life,
any such error is harmless. But where the court imposes death over a jury recommendation
of life, the appellant is more likely to complain of those matters the sentencing judge con-
sidered or failed to consider.
126. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
127. Id. at 606 (plurality opinion).
128. Note, Sentencer Must Have Some Discretion in Imposing Capital Punishment:
Another Retreat from Furman v. Georgia, 44 Mo. L. REV. 359 (1979).
129. Songer v. State, 365 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1978) (on rehearing).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 700.
132. 428 U.S. 249 (1976); see note 110 supra.
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construed the statute in conformity with the view upheld there. 33
B. The Jury's Recommendation
In Taylor v. State," 4 one of the earliest appeals heard under
revised section 921.141, the trial judge had imposed a sentence of
death immediately after the jury had recommended life imprison-
ment. No evidence had been presented by either side on the issues
of aggravation and mitigation. On appeal, the supreme court
looked at the language of subsection (3) of the newly revised law, "5
which directs the trial judge to "weigh" the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances before imposing sentence. The court held
that the trial court's "immediate rejection of the jury's recommen-
dation . . . does not comport with the intent of the legislation."'So
The record indicated "that the trial judge in his haste to impose
sentence may not have properly considered the mitigating circum-
stances enumerated by the statute and found in the record.' ' 3 7
133. 365 So. 2d at 700. Songer had based his argument on language found in the court's
opinion in Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977).
The court in Cooper affirmed a sentence of death based upon a jury recommendation and
held that the trial court had properly refused to admit evidence of the defendant's past
employment, his attempts to avoid the company of his accomplice, and the reputation of the
accomplice for violence. The court found the relation of these matters to the actual crime
too speculative. "(Tihe Legislature chose to list the mitigating circumstances which it judg-
ed to be reliable for determining the appropriateness of a death penalty. . . and we are not
free to expand the list." 336 So. 2d at 1139. In Songer the court said that Cooper "was
concerned not with whether enumerated factors were being raised as mitigation, but with
whether the evidence offered was probative." 365 So. 2d at 700. But see Liebman & Shep-
ard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate": Mental Disorder as
a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEo. L.J. 757, 774 n.84 (1978); Stotzky, Capital Punishment, 31 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 841, 860 n.83 (1977).
The Supreme Court of Florida has considered the culpability of a defendant relative to
that of his accomplices as a possible mitigating circumstance in a number of cases. See
Brown v. State, 367 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1979); Jackson v. State, 366 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1978);
Salvatore v. State, 366 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1978); Smith v. State, 365 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1978);
Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978); Witt v.
State, 342 So. 2d 497 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); Meeks v. State, 339 So. 2d 186
(Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978); Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1976);
Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975). The statutory list of mitigating factors suggests
the relevance of the defendant's relative culpability in the following language: "The defen-
dant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his partici-
pation was relatively minor," FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(d) (1979), and "The defendant acted
under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person," id. §
921.141(6)(e).
134. 294 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1974).
135. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1979).
136. 294 So. 2d at 651.
137. Id. The supreme court reduced the sentence to life, concluding from the record
that the circumstances supported the jury's view rather than the judge's.
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Taylor made clear that the judge must engage in the delibera-
tion mandated by the statute before rejecting-or accepting-a
jury recommendation. But the statute does not indicate what
weight the jury's recommendation should carry. Is the judge to be
influenced by it at all, or is he to engage in an entirely independent
evaluation? The supreme court provided guidance on this question
in Tedder v. State.188 "A jury recommendation under our trifur-
cated death penalty statute should be given great weight. In order
to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of
life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."
'18
Although the words "so clear and convincing that virtually no
reasonable person could differ" may be criticized for creating an
impossible test, subsequent refinements of the Tedder rule have
shown that the test requires great deference to a jury recommenda-
tion based on reason and proper mitigating considerations. In a
case decided the following year, Thompson v. State,140 the court
elaborated on the rule:
This court is well aware that the recommendation of sen-
tence by the jury is only advisory and is not binding on the trial
court. However, the advisory opinion of the jury must be given
serious consideration, or there would be no reason for the legis-
lature to have placed such a requirement in the statute. It
stands to reason that the trial court must express more concise
and particular reasons, based on evidence which cannot be rea-
sonably interpreted to favor mitigation, to overrule a jury's advi-
sory opinion of life imprisonment and enter a sentence of death
than to overrule an advisory opinion recommending death and
enter a sentence of life imprisonment.""
The legislature would not have placed the sentencing decision with
the trial judge, if it had not thought the judge more likely than
the jury to resist the effect of improper and unreasonable con-
siderations.
The court has applied the Tedder rule in a number of subse-
quent cases in which the jury recommended life and there was
138. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
139. Id. at 910. The court ordered the sentence reduced to life in accord with the jury
recommendation, finding one of the trial court's recited aggravating circumstances
erroneous.
140. 328 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976).
141. Id. at 5. The court found the jury's recommendation of life reasonable and ordered
the penalty reduced to life.
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some evidence in the record providing a reasonable basis for the
recommendation. 142 For example, when psychiatric testimony indi-
cated mental disturbance or raised substantial questions about a
defendant's mental capacity, the court found a reasonable basis for




In Chambers v. State, 44 the court applied the Tedder rule in
the case of a murder resulting from a violent lovers' quarrel. The
relationship had often exploded into violence. The jury recom-
mended life on the basis of the extreme mental and emotional con-
ditions present in the relationship.1 45 In an opinion concurred in by
three justices, the court explained the importance of the jury
recommendation:
Where a jury and a trial judge reach contrary conclusions be-
cause the facts derive from conflicting evidence, or where they
have struck a different balance between aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances which both have been given an opportu-
nity to evaluate, the jury recommendation should be followed
because that body has been assigned by history and statute the
responsibility to discern truth and mete out justice. Given that
the imposition of a death penalty "is not a mere counting pro-
cess of X number of aggravating circumstances and Y number of
mitigating circumstances, but rather a reasoned judgment... ",
both our Anglo-American jurisprudence and Florida's death
penalty statute favor the judgment of jurors over that of
jurists.'"
The court did not, however, explain why a jury recommendation
should receive greater deference when it is for life than when it is
for death, as implied in Tedder and explicitly stated in Thomp-
son.14 7 The need for consistent application of the death penalty de-
142. The supreme court has also invoked the Tedder rule, without discussion of any
mitigation in the record, where "reasonable persons can differ" on the propriety of the death
sentence. Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783, 787 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969
(1977). The fact of a co-perpetrator's immunity has been held a reasonable basis for a jury
recommendation of life. Brown v. State, 367 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1979).
143. Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1977); Jones v. State, 331 So. 2d 615 (Fla.
1976); see FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(b), (e), (f) (1979).
144. 339 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1976).
145. The defendant was arrested for severely beating his girlfriend. After she posted
bond for him, they became embroiled in an argument and he beat her so severely that she
died five days later of her injuries. Id. at 205. The beatings were incident to an ongoing
sado-masochistic relationship. Id. at 209 (England, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 208-09 (England, J., concurring).
147. Thompson v. State, 328 So. 2d at 5; Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d at 910.
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mands judicial rejection of a jury recommendation of life that,
even though reasonable, deviates from the standards developed
and applied in other cases. But the need to minimize the risk of an
improvident death sentence speaks loudly in favor of giving the
benefit of the doubt to a jury recommendation of life.
The supreme court cited the Tedder decision in the later case
of LeDuc v. State.""8 The defendant in LeDuc pleaded guilty to
two capital felonies and the court empaneled a special jury to con-
sider punishment. The jury heard a summary of evidence concern-
ing the crimes and an argument by the defense that the defendant
was mentally disturbed. In keeping with a bargain for the guilty
pleas, the prosecutor did not ask for death, but listed for the jury
the aggravating circumstances he thought the evidence showed.
The jury recommended death. On appeal, the supreme court said:
The primary standard for our review of death sentences is
that the recommended sentence of a jury should not be dis-
turbed if all relevant data was [sic] considered, unless there ap-
pear strong reasons to believe that reasonable persons could not
agree with the recommendation. On the record placed before the
jury in this case, a recommended sentence of death was certainly
reasonable. Indeed, the only data on which a life recommenda-
tion could have been made would have had to be grounded on
the nonevidentiary recommendation of the prosecutor and the
emotional plea of defense counsel.
149
The court thus stated the rule differently in LeDuc than it had in
the Thompson and Tedder cases, providing the same burden for
justifying a departure from a jury recommendation whether the
recommendation is for life or for death.
Under the Tedder rule, a jury recommendation of life is of
great benefit to a defendant sentenced to death, because the su-
preme court will reduce the sentence to life if its examination of
the record indicates that the judge ignored or did not properly con-
sider anything that in reason could have influenced the jury. The
rule as stated in LeDuc has somewhat different consequences on
appeal. When judge and jury agree on death, the supreme court
will not "cast aside that careful deliberation which the matter of
sentence has already received by the jury and the trial judge, un-
less there has been a material departure by either of them from
their proper functions" or unless the death penalty is plainly dis-
148. 365 So. 2d 149, 151 n.5 (Fla. 1978).
149. Id. at 151 (footnotes omitted).
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proportionate to the crime.1" The court is therefore less likely to
favor an argument on appeal that the judge failed to consider miti-
gating circumstances, since presumably the jury heard the claim of
mitigation and rejected it.' "
C. Written Findings of Fact
The capital felony sentencing law requires that the judge
make written findings of fact in support of a sentence of death. 
2
This requirement is particularly important because of its relation
to appellate review.15 3 It is error for the trial court to consider cir-
cumstances and information that do not relate to a statutory ag-
gravating circumstance.1 5 4 The written findings show the appellate
court what considerations were determinative in the judge's deci-
sionmaking process. When the findings indicate that the judge con-
sidered nonstatutory aggravating factors, or erroneously found a
listed aggravating factor through misconstruction of the statute,
there is error requiring resentencing, unless the error can be called
harmless.15
One of the errors of trial courts revealed in their recitations of
findings is the "doubling up" of aggravating circumstances by bas-
ing more than one statutory factor on essentially the same aspect
of the crime. " "Doubling up" gives an inflated weight to a single
factor and distorts the weighing process. In Provence v. State,
57
150. Hargrave v. State, 366 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1978).
151. Jackson v. State, 366 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1978).
152. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1979).
153. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
154. See cases cited note 111 supra. In Elledge, the court found error both in the pres-
entation to the jury of testimony and argument relative to a nonstatutory aggravating cir-
cumstance and in the judge's reliance on the same in imposing death. The judge also mis-
construed the statute to find statutory aggravating circumstances for which there was no
support in the evidence. These errors were not harmless because the findings also indicated
the presence of mitigating circumstances. On appeal, the supreme court granted the defen-
dant a new sentencing trial. Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1003 (Fla. 1977); accord, Me-
nendez v. State, 368 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1979) (consideration of improper aggravating factors
not harmless error because mitigating factor was present; resentencing ordered).
155. See, e.g., Dobbert v. State, 375 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1979); Mikenas v. State, 367 So.
2d 606 (Fla. 1978); Hargrave v. State, 366 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1978). If the sentencer considers
improper matters in aggravation, but there are no mitigating circumstances, the error is
harmless. 375 So. 2d at 1071; 366 So. 2d at 5. If there were mitigating circumstances, the
error is not harmless because an impermissible aggravating factor may have tipped the bal-
ance in favor of death. Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 885-86 (Fla. 1979); Mikenas v. State,
367 So. 2d at 610; Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d at 1003.
156. See Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1976).
157. Id.
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the trial court found that the capital felony was committed in the
course of a robbery " and that it was committed for pecuniary
gain. 5 9 In holding that this reasoning gave improper double con-
sideration to a single factor, the supreme court said:
While we would agree that in some cases, such as where a lar-
ceny is committed in the course of a rape-murder, subsections
(d) and (f) refer to separate analytical concepts and can validly
be considered to constitute two circumstances, here as in all rob-
bery-murders, both subsections refer to the same aspect of the
defendant's crime. Consequently, one who commits a capital
crime in the course of a robbery will always begin with two ag-
gravating circumstances against him .... 10
Just as other erroneous recitations of findings in aggravation
can be harmless,' a "doubling up" error is harmless when prop-
erly established statutory aggravating circumstances are present
and no mitigating circumstances weigh against them.1' But when
at least one mitigating circumstance is present and the sentencing
judge relies on two statutory aggravating factors established by the
same feature of the crime, or otherwise erroneously relies on some
factor, the sentence must be reconsidered because the appellate
court in such circumstances is "unable to determine what signifi-
cance this factor was given in the weighing process."'' 6
III. APPELLATE REVIEW
Under pre-Furman law,'" one convicted of a capital felony or
any other crime had a right to an appeal. 1" Jurisdiction over ap-
peals of death sentences lay with the supreme court.1'" Under the
new capital felony sentencing law, appellate review is an integral
part of the sentencing process, maintaining consistency in the im-
158. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d) (1979).
159. See id. § 921.141(5)(f).
160. 337 So. 2d at 786 (emphasis in original). The jury had recommended life. On ap-
peal, the supreme court corrected the "doubling up," eliminated another recited aggravating
factor as erroneous, invoked the Tedder rule, compared the seriousness of the capital felony
to that found in other cases, and ordered the sentence reduced to life without discussing
whether mitigating factors had been shown to provide a rational basis for the jury
recommendation.
161. See note 155 supra.
162. Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1979); Hargrave v. State, 366 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1978); Jackson v. State, 359 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1978).
163. Fleming v. State, 374 So. 2d 954, 959 (Fla. 1978).
164. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1971) (amended 1972).
165. Id. §§ 924.05, .08(1).
166. See note 16 supra.
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position of the death penalty. It is one of the five steps discussed
in Dixon that stand between the convicted capital felon and the
extreme penalty. 167 Proffitt placed special emphasis on the impor-
tance of the appellate review process as a means of assuring "pro-
portionality review. '' 68
Appellate review of a judgment imposing the sentence of
death is not a matter of personal right, but is mandated by the
statute directing "automatic review."'169 The defendant cannot
waive appellate review,17 0 because the statute protects the interest
of society in seeing that the courts impose death sentences only
when appropriate.' 7 ' Under Florida law, an improper death sen-
tence is no less improper because the defendant does not object to
it. The role of appellate review is to ensure consistency and con-
formity to the standards established as public policy. Therefore, a
motion of an appellant to dismiss his appeal will be denied because
the court has a duty to "examine the record to be sure that the
imposition of the death sentence complies with all of the standards
set by the Constitution, the Legislature and the courts.
'1 72
In reviewing a judgment and sentence of death, the appellate
court must examine the entire record to determine whether there
was reversible error. 73 If, through no fault of the defendant, neces-
sary portions of trial court transcripts are lost or destroyed or were
never produced, there must be a new trial.
Since the full transcript of the proceedings requested by the
defendant is unavailable for review by this Court, and since the
omitted requested portions of the transcript are necessary to a
complete review of this cause, this Court has no alternative but
to remand for a new trial of the cause.
17'
167. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
168. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976).
169. Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 924.05, .08(1) (1971) with id. § 921.141(4) (1979).
170. Goode v. State, 365 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1978); cf. Aldridge v. State, 351 So. 2d 942
(Fla. 1977) (defendant's request for death sentence in lower court has no bearing on court's
decision on appeal).
171. See generally Comment, The Death Penalty and Guilty Pleas: Ohio Rule
11(c)(3)-A Constitutional Answer to a Capital Defendant's Dilemma, 5 OHio N.U.L. REv.
687 (1978) (suggesting that a waiver amounting to a consent to be executed cannot be know-
ing and intelligent).
172. Goode v. State, 365 So. 2d at 384; accord, Stone v. State, 378 So. 2d 765 (Fla.
1979).
173. See, e.g., Gibson v. State, 351 So. 2d 948, 949 n.2 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1004 (1978). The scope of review in capital cases is broad. "In capital cases, the court shall
review the evidence to determine if the interest of justice requires a new trial, whether or
not insufficiency of the evidence-is an issue presented for review." FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(f).
174. Delap v. State, 350 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 1977) (footnote omitted).
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In considering the propriety of the sentence of death," ' the
reviewing court examines the trial court's written findings of fact.
It can reject improper or unsupported findings, or find matters in
the record that should have been considered but were not. Al-
though the court once said that it may reduce the sentence to life
as an "exercise of mercy" based on "reasoned judgment" even in a
case with facts that render death appropriate,'17 6 the court more
recently said:
It is not the function of this court to cull through what has been
listed as aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the trial
court's order, determine which are proper for consideration and
which are not, and then impose the proper sentence. In accor-




A. Capital Felony Committed by a Person
Under Sentence of Imprisonment
What is the public policy behind the aggravating factor listed
in section 921.141(5)(a) of the Florida Statutes, concerning capital
felonies committed while the defendant remains under a sentence
of imprisonment? 178 Does the statute aim to increase the punish-
ment of persons with previous criminality, or to have a deterrent
effect on a certain category of persons? In other words, did the
legislature intend to punish some parties more severely than others
not only for the capital felony but for past criminality as well? Or
did it frame the law to deter a particular kind of person from vio-
lent crime? For instance, the prospect of further imprisonment
may not deter long-term prisoners from crime in prison or from
attempting to escape through life-threatening means. The statu-
tory factor also comes into play in the case of capital felonies com-
mitted by persons on parole from prison. Although one could not
say that such persons have "nothing to lose," subsection (5)(a) may
provide such persons a clear incentive to avoid life-threatening
crime.
175. Of course, the reviewing court also considers matters concerning the fairness of the
trial that resulted in the guilty verdict.
176. Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533, 540 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976).
177. Mikenas v. State, 367 So. 2d 606, 610 (Fla. 1978) (nonstatutory aggravating factor
considered; resentencing ordered).
178. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(a) (1979).
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In Songer v. State,179 the supreme court found that the record
established the aggravating circumstance of the defendant's being
under sentence of imprisonment at the time of the capital felony.
The appellant had escaped from prison in Oklahoma. His impris-
onment had been for car theft and his remaining criminal history
was not a violent one.180 In Darden v. State,'8' the court men-
tioned that the appellant was on furlough from prison at the time
of the capital felony, but did not rely on this fact in affirming the
sentence of death, because there were a number of other aggravat-
ing factors.'
In Stone v. State,'88 the court rejected the argument that this
factor should apply only to persons in prison, persons on parole, or
escapees from prison. In that case the court squarely considered
the legislative intent in drafting this factor. The appellant had pre-
viously been in prison, but at the time of the capital felony had
been released on habeas corpus by a federal district court. Al-
though affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, the district court order was
eventually reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.'"
The appellant contended that the trial judge erred in finding an
aggravating circumstance, in that the appellant had been "under
sentence of imprisonment" when he committed the capital felony
while free on habeas corpus. The Supreme Court of Florida re-
jected the argument:
The sole purpose of the federal proceedings in habeas
corpus was to determine the legality of the restraint on liberty.
As long as the proceedings in federal court were pending,
defendant was under sentence of imprisonment,, and would re-
main so until the federal proceedings were concluded favorably
to defendant. The final determination was that defendant be re-
turned to custody.185
Thus, it appears that a previously imposed but unexpired prison
term supplies this aggravating circumstance, not only when the of-
fender has escaped or is on furlough or parole, but also when he
179. 365 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1978) (on rehearing).
180. Id.
181. 329 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 704 (1977).
182. In Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1979) and in Dobbert v. State, 375 So. 2d
1069 (Fla. 1979), the trial judges recited the factor but the supreme court rejected it as
unsupported. The supreme court did not discuss a similar finding in affirming the death
penalty in Thomas v. State, 374 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1979).
183. 378 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1979).
184. Wainwright v. Stone, 478 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
185. 378 So. 2d at 772 (citation omitted).
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has been ordered released by habeas corpus and is lawfully at lib-
erty without restriction.
B. Previous Conviction for Another Capital Felony or for a
Felony Involving the Use or Threat of Violence to the Person
1. IN GENERAL
A question of legislative intent arises also in the case of' sec-
tion 921.141(5)(b), which defines certain previous convictions as an
aggravating factor. 186 Did the legislature intend this factor to iden-
tify offenders who would have a propensity""7 to commit violence if
at liberty, or did it intend the death penalty to have a deterrent
effect on persons already convicted of violent felonies?
In Swan v. State,"' the appellant was convicted of a murder
that took place while charges were pending against the appellant
for resisting arrest with violence. In imposing sentence for the
murder charge, the trial judge held that the prior violent offense
could not be considered an aggravating circumstance justifying im-
position of the death sentence for the murder, because the adjudi-
cation of guilt on that charge took place after the murder.
Later, in Provence v. State,189 the court had to determine
186. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(b) (1979).
187. In Proffitt v. State, 315 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), the su-
preme court gave implicit approval to the trial court's finding that the defendant had a
"propensity" to commit murder. In a much later decision the court held that a similar con-
sideration recited by the trial judge was outside the statutory list and improper. Miller v.
State, 373 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1979). See generally Dix, Administration of the Texas Death
Penalty Statutes: Constitutional Infirmities Related to the Prediction of Dangerousness,
55 TEx. L. REV. 1343 (1977).
In Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976), the trial
court allowed the state to present evidence of a previous rape prosecution in Michigan, even
though the proceedings there had resulted in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
By that testimony, the state attempted to show that the defendant was in fact sane at the
time of the incident in Michigan. The supreme court declined to hold that this was error,
pointing out that Michigan has a broader insanity defense than Florida, and that the statute
mandates a broad application of the rules of evidence, i.e., rules of relevance. In Huckaby v.
State, 343 So, 2d 29 (Fla. 1977), the trial court listed as an aggravating circumstance that
the offender had a propensity to commit rape. There was evidence that the appellant had
sexually abused his daughters over a long period of time. The supreme court said: "This
attempt to predict future conduct is without relation to any statutory aggravating circum-
stance, and must be stricken." Id. at 33 n.11.
188. 322 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1975). Appellant was convicted of a beating death committed
during a robbery in a private home. The jury recommended life, but the trial judge imposed
the death penalty, which on appeal was reduced to life.
189. 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977) (stabbing death in




whether this aggravating factor could be established by evidence of
past violent criminality short of conviction. The court said:
"Clearly the language of that subsection excludes the possibility of
considering mere arrests or accusations as factors in aggrava-
tion."190 This interpretation still left unclear whether the legisla-
ture had intended that the requirement of a previous conviction
would ensure reliable identification of persons with a propensity to
violence, or would appeal to the capacity of certain persons to con-
trol their violent proclivities.
The decision in Elledge v. State' 91 provided some guidance on
this question. The court considered whether it was proper to put
before the jury testimony and argument concerning two murders
committed after the capital felony for which the offender was be-
ing sentenced. At the time of sentencing the appellant had been
convicted of one of these. Rejecting the appellant's contention that
the conviction could not be considered because obtained subse-
quently, the court said:
Such an assertion simply does not comport with a plain reading
of the statute. It is clear that the Legislature referred to "previ-
ous convictions" and not "previous crimes." It is apparent that
the appellant had at the time of the trial in this case been con-
victed of the Nelson murder. In Provence v. State, 337 So.2d
783 (Fla.1976), we held that it was improper to consider under
Section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, two armed robbery
charges pending against Provence which predated the commis-
sion of the murder for which he was being tried. It was there
emphasized that prior conviction was the essential element of
that aggravating circumstance.19
Not only was the previous conviction admissible, but the court said
it was also proper to present testimony to the jury concerning the
circumstances of the crime on which the previous conviction was
based.
This is so because we believe the purpose for considering aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances is to engage in a character
analysis of the defendant to ascertain whether the ultimate pen-
alty is called for in his or her particular case. Propensity to com-
mit violent crimes surely must be a valid consideration for the
jury and the judge. It is matter that can contribute to decisions
as to sentence which will lead to uniform treatment and help
190. Id. at 786 (referring to FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (1979)).
191. 346 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1976).
192. Id. at 1001 (emphasis in original).
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eliminate "total arbitrariness and capriciousness in [the] imposi-
tion" of the death penalty.'9 8
Testimony on the other murder, for which the appellant had not
.yet been brought to trial, was held improper. 9"
Propensity to commit crimes, then, is one of the characteris-
tics of the offender on which the capital felony sentencing law fo-
cuses. But the existence of this characteristic must be established
in the fashion indicated by the legislature-by previous adjudica-
tion. There is no requirement, however, that the offender have
been convicted of another capital or violent felony before he com-
mits the capital felony for which sentence is imposed.
2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In Mikenas v. State,195 the trial judge listed as an aggravating
circumstance the fact that the defendant "has a substantial history
of prior criminal activity."'" On appeal, the supreme court re-
sponded tersely: "The inclusion of this non-statutory aggravating
circumstance indicates that the weighing process dictated by the
statute was not followed.' 197 In Ford v. State,'" the trial court
found the aggravating circumstance of a previous conviction for a
violent felony, referring to a conviction for breaking and entering
with intent to commit a felony and the defendant's admission to
the sale of illegal drugs. The supreme court held it was error to
base the conclusion on these factors, adhering to the proposition
that the statute must be strictly followed to ensure reliability. The
statute requires previous convictions, not arrests or accusations,
and only crimes of life-threatening behavior qualify under subsec-
tion (5)(b). The court reiterated its "propensity" rationale in
Harvard v. State,"9' holding that the capital felony together with a
previous conviction for aggravated assault demonstrated a "pro-
pensity toward calculated homicide.
'200
193. Id. (quoting Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976)).
194. Id. at 1002.
195. 367 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1978).
196. Id. at 609.
197. Id. at 610. The sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
198. 374 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1979).
199. 375 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 956 (1979).
200. Id. at 835. In Foster v. State, 369 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1979), the trial court neither
found nor indicated reliance upon previous convictions. Nevertheless, in comparing the facts
with other cases, the supreme court referred to the appellant's "lengthy history of violence"
and affirmed the sentence of death. Id. at 931.
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In Miller v. State,0 1 the trial judge recited several aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in his findings of fact. He then stated
that the mitigating factors would ordinarily outweigh the aggravat-
ing circumstances, which included a previous felony involving the
threat of violence to another person. Nevertheless, the judge im-
posed the death sentence because the offender, who suffered from
paranoid schizophrenia and hallucinations, might otherwise some-
day win parole and become a threat to others. 202 On appeal, the
supreme court held improper the use of this consideration as an
aggravating factor to tip the balance toward death. "The aggravat-
ing circumstances specified in the statute are exclusive," the court
said, "and no others may be used for that purpose. '20 3 Emphasiz-
ing the need for strict compliance with the statute, the court ex-
plained further:
The trial judge's use of the defendant's mental illness, and his
resulting propensity to commit violent acts, as an aggravating
factor favoring the imposition of the death penalty appears con-
trary to the legislative intent as set forth in the statute. The
legislature has not authorized consideration of the probability of
recurring violent acts by the defendant if he is released on pa-
role in the distant future. To the contrary, a large number of the
statutory mitigating factors reflect a legislative determination to
mitigate the death penalty in favor of a life sentence for those
persons whose responsibility for their violent actions has been
substantially diminished as a result of a mental illness, uncon-
trolled emotional state of mind, or drug abuse.
... Whether a defendant who is convicted of a capital
crime and receives a life sentence should be allowed a chance of
parole after 25 years is a policy determination for the legislature
or the parole authorities rather than for the courts.2 °0
C. Knowing Creation of a Great Risk of
Death to Many Persons
1. IN GENERAL
In construing the meaning of section 921.141(5)(c), which
makes an aggravating factor of the fact that "[t]he defendant
201. 373 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1979).
202. Id. at 885.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 886.
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knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons, "205 the
court said in Dixon v. State that "tihe use of the adjectives 'great'
and 'many' is attacked as vague, but we feel that a man of ordinary
intelligence and knowledge easily conceives the concepts in-
volved."206 On its face this factor seems directed at behavior carry-
ing a risk of catastrophic social consequences. Yet, notwithstanding
judicial approval of the statute in Dixon, many unanswered ques-
tions remained concerning the penological purpose of subsection
(5)(c) and its proper application in light of its purposes.
2 07
Some answers soon appeared. In Huckaby v. State,06 the trial
court found that the defendant created a great risk of harm to
many. The capital felony at issue was sexual battery on a child;20 9
the record included evidence of appellant's abuse of his family over
a long period of time, including sexual abuse of his daughters. In
approving the trial court's finding that the factor was established,
the supreme court noted that the appellant "apparently made sin-
cere threats on the lives of his nine children and wife over the
course of many years, and he in fact caused them bodily harm
from beatings and other forms of wanton cruelty."210 This applica-
tion suggests that because subsection (5)(c) describes conduct of
the defendant without mentioning the "commission of the capital
felony," conduct other than that directly associated with the capi-
tal felony can constitute aggravation that renders the death pen-
alty appropriate.
Similarly, in Barclay v. State,1 the court implicitly approved
the trial court's finding of aggravation based on conduct surround-
ing, but not directly involved in, the capital felony. The trial court
found that before committing a heinous, racially motivated kid-
napping and stabbing murder, the appellants had tried unsuccess-
fully to select five different potential murder victims and had sent
inflammatory tape recordings describing the murder to radio and
television stations.
21 2
In Elledge v. State,21 8 however, the trial court placed a differ-
205. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(c) (1979).
206. 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
207. See, e.g., Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923
(1976).
208. 343 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1978).
209. See FLA. STAT. § 794.011(2) (1979).
210. 343 So. 2d at 33. The sentence, however, was reduced to life.
211. 343 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1977).
212. Id. at 1268, 1271 n.4.
213. 346 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1977).
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ent construction on the statute. There, in concluding that the de-
fendant had created a great risk of death to many persons, the trial
judge focused on behavior surrounding a criminal episode separate
from the capital felony for which he was sentencing the defendant.
The supreme court held this consideration inappropriate: "It is
only conduct surrounding the capital felony for which the defen-
dant is being sentenced which properly may be considered in de-
termining whether the defendant 'knowingly created a great risk of
death to many persons.' ""
2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Against the background of decisions culminating in the El-
ledge construction, the supreme court more recently has further
refined its interpretation of subsection (5)(c). Although Elledge
seemed to settle whether conduct directly connected with the capi-
tal felony must create the risk of danger to others, it left unan-
swered other questions inherent in the statutory language.
The supreme court disposed of some of these problems in
Kampff v. State.215 In that case, a trial court found a knowing cre-
ation of great risk where one person shot another at close range in
the presence of two other persons. The trial judge based that find-
ing on the presence of the two bystanders, the fact that the busi-
ness premises where the killing took place employed many people
and was located at a busy intersection, and the fact that only two
of the five bullets fired struck the victim. The supreme court re-
jected that rationale:
We consider first the finding that the firing of five shots at
close range under the circumstances established that the appel-
lant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
There was evidence that two persons besides the appellant and
the victim were present in the store at the time of the shooting.
There were other people in the building and in the general area.
One of the bullets appellant fired ricocheted and lodged in a
wall.
When the legislature chose the words with which to estab-
lish this aggravating circumstance, it indicated clearly that more
was contemplated than a showing of some degree of risk of bod-
ily harm to a few persons. "Great risk" means not a mere possi-
bility but a likelihood or high probability. The great risk of
death created by the capital felon's actions must be to "many"
214. Id. at 1004.
215. 371 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1979).
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persons. By using the word "many," the legislature indicated
that a great risk of death to a small number of people would not
establish this aggravating circumstance. We hold that the trial
court erred in finding that the appellant created a great risk of
death to many persons.""'
But in Ford v. State17 the court subsequently affirmed the
death sentence for a robbery-murder in which the "great risk" fac-
tor was based on circumstances rendered dubious by Elledge and
Kampff, although the court did not discuss its approval of the
finding. In the still later case of Dobbert v. State,1 s the court cited
Kampff and Elledge in rejecting a finding of knowing creation of
great risk, which the trial court had presumably based on the ap-
pellant's violent abuse of not only the victim, his nine-year-old
daughter, but his other children as well. The supreme court may
have rejected the finding of the aggravating circumstance because
it was based on conduct not directly surrounding the capital fel-
ony,1 9 or perhaps because Dobbert's other children did not fit the
"many persons" requirement of the statute."0
D. Capital Felony Committed in Connection with Another
Enumerated Violent Felony, or for Pecuniary Gain
It is convenient to discuss subsection (5)(d) and subsection
(5)(f) together because these factors frequently appear together in
the cases. Similar to other aggravating factors specified in the stat-
ute, these two may reflect an attempt to deter criminals from en-
gaging in life-threatening conduct as they pursue their criminal ac-
tivities.' 21 At the same time, these factors may express the belief
216. Id. at 1009-10.
217. 374 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1979). In Ford, a policeman was shot and killed during the
defendant's attempt to escape the scene of a robbery of a large restaurant during business
hours. The judge's finding stated: "The trial evidence shows that the defendant not only
threatened a number of other persons beside [sic] the decedent with a deadly weapon; he
further operated a stolen motor vehicle at high rates of speed and at an obvious risk to the
lives and safety of many others in the highways." Id. at 501.
218. 375 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1979).
219. See Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d at 1004.
220. See Kampff v. State, 371 So. 2d at 1009-10.
221. But if a man must needs commit an offence of some kind or other, the next
object is to induce him to commit an offence less mischievous, rather than one
more mischievous, of two offences that will either of them suit his purpose.
When a man has resolved upon a particular offence, the next object is to
dispose him do to no more mischief than is necessary to his purpose: in other
words, to do as little mischief as is consistent with the benefit he has in view.
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, ch. XIV, 1
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that murders committed in the course of these various criminal ac-
tivities are more culpable and therefore more deserving of punish-
ment than murders committed in the absence of these aggravating
circumstances.
222
The factor of pecuniary gain, in subsection (5)(f), sometimes
overlaps with the commission of other enumerated violent felonies,
in subsection (5)(d). A number of decisions have noted this analyt-
ical overlap.223 Although the court has not expressly examined the
legislative intent in listing the pecuniary gain factor as an aggra-
vating circumstance, Salvatore v. State22 4 illustrates the kind of
situation to which this factor was probably intended to ap-
ply-murder for hire. It is doubtful that the Salvatore murder
could have been construed as committed in the course of a rob-
bery, but the trial court.found the motive of pecuniary gain inher-
ent in the following facts:
The defendant was to gain directly from the proceeds of the sale
of the boat, which he admitted he had previously stolen on be-
half of the victim, and which he then stole again from the victim
for the purposes of sharing in the proceeds of the sale, as well as
for purposes of concealing the homicide that he had committed.
The defendant also hoped to gain a pecuniary advantage indi-
rectly in that he had been promised by the co-defendant future
4, 5 (W. Harrison ed. 1948) (emphasis in original).
222. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
223. E.g., Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969
(1977). The court in this case distinguished the two concepts of a murder committed in the
course of a robbery and a murder committed for pecuniary gain. The trial court found both
factors and appeared to give them separate consideration in the process of weighing of cir-
cumstances. On appeal, the supreme court said:
The State argues the existence of two aggravating circumstances, that the mur-
der occurred in the commission of the robbery [subsection (d)] and that the
crime was committed for pecuniary gain [subsection (f)]. While we would agree
that in some cases, such as where a larceny is committed in the course of a rape-
murder, subsections (d) and (f) refer to separate analytical concepts and can
validly be considered to constitute two circumstances, here, as in all robbery-
murders, both subsections refer to the same aspect of the defendant's crime.
Consequently, one who commits a capital crime in the course of a robbery will
always begin with two aggravating circumstances against him while those who
commit such a crime in the course of any other enumerated felony will not be
similarly disadvantaged. Mindful that our decision in death penalty cases must
result from more than a simple summing of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973), we believe that Provence's
pecuniary motive at the time of the murder constitutes only one factor which we
must consider in this case.
Id. at 786.
224. 366 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1978).
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financial rewards for the commission of this crime. 25
On appeal, the supreme court upheld the trial court's weighing
process, thus approving this indirect-reward or fruits-of-the-crime
approach to pecuniary motive.
2 2 6
E. Capital Felony Committed for the Purpose of
Avoiding or Preventing a Lawful Arrest
or Effecting an Escape from Custody
To the extent that subsections (5)(d) and (5)(f) emphasize the
moral culpability of killing in the course of committing a crime,
they overlap somewhat with subsection (5)(e), which makes killing
to avoid arrest or to escape custody an aggravating circumstance .
7
As with the other statutory aggravating circumstances, an observer
can only guess at what penological purposes this factor advances.
Is it intended to encourage the professional criminal to stop his
activities short of homicide? Or was it meant to focus on the repre-
hensible character of an execution-style murder?
28
In Washington v. State,29 the appellant had been convicted of
a series of murders. For two of the murders, the supreme court
held that evidence of conduct seeking to cover up the capital felo-
nies themselves established an intention to avoid detection and ar-
rest. The court's approach is subject to criticism for focusing on
behavior following the capital felony, because the statutory factor
seems directed at murders committed to eliminate evidence or to
prevent investigation of other, separate criminal activity.
2 30
In Riley v. State,81 the court addressed the issue of whether
the factor extends beyond situations such as the killing of a police
officer to avoid arrest, to include the elimination of witnesses:
Since the facts show this to be an execution-type killing to
avoid lawful arrest, we necessarily reach the broader issue of
whether the language of the applicable provision encompasses
225. Id. at 748.
226. Id. at 752.
227. Compare FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d), (W (1979) with id. § 921.141(5)(e).
228. In Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976),
which involved a triple murder, the court stated that the murder of two of the victims had
"obviously" been committed "in order to avoid a surviving witness to the murder of the
other victim." Id. at 540. In Songer v. State, 322 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1975), the court found this
factor where Songer, a fugitive prisoner possibily avoiding arrest, shot and killed a state
trooper making a routine inspection of Songer's automobile.
229. 362 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979).
230. See id. at 667 (England, J., concurring).
231. 366 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1978).
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the murder of a witness to a crime as well as law enforcement
personnel. We hold that it does. See Sullivan v. State, 303 So.2d
632 (Fla.1974). We caution, however, that the mere fact of a
death is not enough to invoke this factor when the victim is not
a law enforcement official. Proof of the requisite intent to avoid
arrest and detection must be very strong in these cases. Here, of
course, it was."'
Thus, in contrast to the somewhat loose interpretation given sub-
section (5)(e) in Washington, the court read it more restrictively in
Riley.
In a later case, the court implicitly recognized the infirmities
of Washington. In Menendez v. State,"'3 the state argued that the
defendant's use of a murder weapon equipped with a silencer sup-
ported the trial court's finding of an attempt to avoid arrest. The
supreme court rejected this argument:
There is also considerable doubt that this murder was com-
mitted for the purpose of avoiding arrest within the contempla-
tion of our statute. The state urges (with some logic) that any
murder committed by means of a pistol fitted with a silencer
indicates a motivation to avoid arrest and detection. The pre-
sumption accorded the instrument of murder by this reasoning,
however, carries us too far. Were this argument accepted, then
the perpetration of murder with a knife would similarly add an
aggravating circumstance to the life-or-death equation, since it
is less detectable than a firearm. This mechanical application of
the statute would divert the life-and-death choice away from the
nature of the defendant and the deed, as the statute seems to
require. In Riley v. State, 366 So.2d 19 (Fla.1978), we held that
an intent to avoid arrest is not present, at least when the victim
is not a law enforcement officer, unless it is clearly shown that
the dominant or only motive for the murder was the elimination
of witnesses. Here, unlike Riley, we do not know what events
preceded the actual killing; we only know that a weapon was
brought to the scene which, if used, would minimize detection.
We cannot assume Menendez's motive; the burden was on the
state to prove it.'"
Although one might reasonably infer that a robber who carries a
firearm equipped with a silencer both anticipates that he may use
the weapon and seeks to avoid detection if he does use it, the use
232. Id. at 22 (footnotes omitted).
233. 368 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1979).
234. Id. at 1282 (footnote omitted).
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of a silencer does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a sub-
sequent killing was motivated by the desire to have the robbery go
undetected.3
In Dobbert v. State,23 the court upheld a death sentence for a
father who had murdered his nine-year-old daughter. The evidence
showed that he had violently abused the child, denied her medical
attention, then finally killed her to prevent discovery of her condi-
tion and to avoid arrest. Because the child's very existence was
proof of the father's criminal abuse, the court found that the ag-
gravating circumstance of the avoidance of detection was present.
In contrast to the Washington decision, this application of the
statute reaffirmed that mere attempts to cover up evidence of the
capital felony itself are insufficient to establish that the defendant
sought to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest.
F. Disruption or Hindrance of Government or Law
Enforcement
Subsection (5)(g) describes as an aggravating factor the dis-
ruption or hindrance of government or law enforcement,3 7 a cir-
cumstance likely to overlap with the factor of avoiding or prevent-
ing arrest or escaping from custody.238 The latter factor typically
applies to the killing of a police officer and must be established
with particularly compelling force when applied to an ordinary wit-
ness.2 9 The courts, it might be suggested, should construe subsec-
tion (5)(g) to cover other kinds of situations on the assumption
that the legislature had a distinct purpose in making this a sepa-
rate consideration. Because the decisions have applied subsection
(5)(e) to the cases of gun battles with police, arguably subsection
(5)(g) should apply to activities of a more broadly disruptive na-
ture, e.g., assassination, political extortion, and the bombing of
government buildings and conveyances.
235. See Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1979), where the shooting of a police officer
"when he posed no danger to Ford's escape and was in fact trying to cooperate with the
armed appellant," apparently provided the basis both for avoiding and preventing his ar-
rest and for a finding of "heinousness".
236. 375 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1979). Dobbert's convictions and sentence of death were pre-
viously affirmed. Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). The
court subsequently remanded for consideration of a possible Gardner violation and, after
the trial court's response, relinquished jurisdiction for resentencing. The propriety of the
new sentence of death then came before the court for review.
237. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(g) (1979).
238. Id. § 921.141(5)(e).
239. Riley v. State, 366 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1978).
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In Barclay v. State24 the supreme court implicitly approved
without extended discussion the trial court's view that an intention
to create catastrophic social disruption fell within subsection (g).
The court perceived the heinous, racially motivated murder in this
instance as an attempt to precipitate a racial war.24 The court did
not address the question of whether, in addition to intent, the de-
fendant must also have a reasonable expectation that massive so-
cial disruption will result. The aggravating factor was linked to the
possibility of catastrophic social consequences, but the decision left
many questions unanswered.
The trial court found the aggravating circumstance of disrup-
tion of government in Raulerson v. State,24 2 in the fact that the
defendant killed a police officer while attempting to escape after a
robbery. On appeal, the supreme court did not address this finding
specifically, but affirmed the sentence based on a general compari-
son of this crime with the circumstances of other such crimes.2 3 In
another case involving a robbery and "shoot-out" with police, Ford
v. State,24 4 the trial court recited a finding of the disruption factor.
On appeal, the supreme court did not directly discuss the propri-
ety of the finding, but held that aggravating circumstances justified
the death penalty, since there were no mitigating factors.2 45
In Ford, the court also found the aggravating circumstance of
arrest avoidance, although both statutory factors seemed based on
the same aspect of the appellant's crime.2 " It can be improper to
"double up" the aggravating circumstances of witness elimination
and hindrance of law enforcement.2 41 In a police "shoot-out,"
avoidance of arrest is the more precise description of the killer's
motive. Thus, the courts are likely to invoke the hindrance or dis-
ruption factor primarily in situations with a potential for broad so-
cial consequences.2
240. 343 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978).
241. Id. at 1271 n.5.
242. 358 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1978).
243. Id. at 834-35.
244. 374 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1979).
245. Id. at 503.
246. Id.
247. Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1979); see notes 156-63 and accompanying text
supra.
248. See Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978).
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G. Especially Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Capital Felony
In Proffitt v. Florida,4 the Supreme Court of the United
States rejected the petitioner's contention that the words "heinous,
atrocious, or cruel ' 250 were vague and thus failed to provide ade-
quate guidance to the sentencing decision, referring for support to
the application and construction of this phrase by the Supreme
Court of Florida. In State v. Dixon,5 1 the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida rejected arguments that the imprecision of these and other
words in the statute failed to eliminate the unfettered discretion
condemned in Furman."2 ' The court specifically interpreted the
words "heinous, atrocious, or cruel":
[W]e feel that the meaning of such terms is a matter of common
knowledge, so that an ordinary man would not have to guess at
what was intended. It is our interpretation that heinous means
extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means outra-
geously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed to in-
flict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even en-
joyment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be
included are those capital crimes where the actual commission
of the capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as
to set the crimes apart from the norm of capital felonies-the
conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous
to the victim.'58
The interpretive discussion in Dixon did not mention the pur-
poses this factor serves, nor did it spell out exactly why this factor
is relevant in distinguishing capital felonies warranting the death
penalty.'" Analysis of these issues must focus on the penological
justifications cited by the Supreme Court plurality in holding that
capital punishment per se does not violate the eighth amend-
ment.255
249. 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.).
250. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h) (1979).
251. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
252. Id. at 9.
253. Id. The supreme court implicitly approved but did not rely upon a heinousness
finding in affirming the sentence of death in Hallman v. State, 305 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1974),
cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1976).
254. As stated in Dixon, the aggravating circumstances actually define the crimes war-
ranting the death penalty, and when the sentencer finds one of them, death is presumed
appropriate absent any mitigating circumstances. 283 So. 2d at 9.
255. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see Liebman & Shepard, supra note 133 (suggesting that
statutory standards, to satisfy the eighth amendment, must effectuate the penological justi-
fications offered in upholding capital punishment).
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As suggested above, neither the statute nor its construction in
Dixon tells us whether the aim is to deter potential torture-mur-
derers by encouraging them to keep their mischief short of the
homicidal,2  or whether the factor simply permits retaliation for
conduct which outrages the community and severely disturbs its
security and integrity. Doubts have been expressed concerning the
efficacy of capital punishment in deterring offenders whose con-
duct shows them "doubtfully within the reach of influences" that
would inhibit the ordinary person. 257 On the other hand, if deter-
rence is impossible because the potential offender lacks the capac-
ity for self-control, then "retribution" as justification for the factor
would seem questionable as well.25 8
In exploring the purposes of the heinousness factor, we should
ask what kinds of killing or other conduct set a capital felony apart
from the norm. In other words, how, in light of its purposes, are
the courts to apply the heinousness factor? As with the aggravating
factor of capital felonies committed in the course of other serious
felonies,259 we must ask how closely the additional acts must be
associated with the capital felony to set the crime apart from the
norm.
In Alford v. State,260 the appellant committed a capital felony
by shooting-hardly a bizarre or unusual mode of homicide. But
the shooting was directly preceded by vaginal and rectal sexual
battery on the thirteen-year-old victim. The supreme court upheld
the trial court's finding of heinousness on this basis. 26' Thus, acts
of sexual assault, because of the suffering inflicted on the victim,
apparently qualify as heinous under the concept of being "unnec-
essarily torturous."
The court adopted a different approach in Alvord v. State.262
256. J. BENTHAM, supra note 221.
257. Commentary to the Model Penal Code section on capital sentencing states:
This conclusion is not surprising when it is remembered that murders are, upon
the whole, either crimes of passion, in which a calculus of consequences has
small psychological reality, or crimes of such depravity that the actor reveals
himself as doubtfully within the reach of influences that might be especially in-
hibitory in the case of an ordinary man.
MODEL PALN CODE § 201.6, Comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
258. See Liebman & Shepard, supra note 133.
259. See note 214 and accompanying text supra.
260. 307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 912 (1976).
261. Id. at 445. The trial court, also found that appellant committed the capital felony
while engaged in or in flight after committing rape, resulting in some overlap or "doubling
up" of factors. The court also found one mitigating circumstance. Id. at 443.
262. 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976).
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Although the appellant had strangled three women and raped one
of them, the court focused not on the torturous nature of the mode
of killing or on additional acts, but on the cold, calculated nature
of the killings.
Each of the murders was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel
in that the homicides were committed through strangulation by
use of a rope. This could only be accomplished through a cold,
calculated design to kill, as distinguished by [sic] a single shot
from a firearm during an outburst of anger. The great risk of
serious bodily harm by death to other persons is apparent, in
that defendant obviously murdered two of the victims in order
to avoid a surviving witness to the murder of the other victim.2 68
In Purdy v. State,"" the jury convicted the appellant of sexual
battery on a child and recommended death, finding heinousness as
the only aggravating circumstance. Although the crime presumably
inflicted suffering on the eight-year-old female victim, the court
held that nothing set the crime apart from the "normal" violation
of the same statute." 5 To hold this crime heinous would be to say
that child rape is always an aggravated capital felony for which the
death penalty is appropriate. This result, the court concluded,
would violate the proscription against mandatory death penalty
statutes.2"6 Another case in which nothing set the crime apart from
the norm was Cooper v. State.2 7 The appellant shot and killed a
deputy sheriff in the course of a grocery store robbery getaway.
The trial court recited heinousness as a factor, but the supreme
court held that as a matter of law the killing was not heinous be-
cause the death was instantaneous and painless.
2"8
The supreme court further developed the importance of the
mode of killing and of the surrounding circumstances in Funchess
v. State 9 and in Knight v. State.27 0 In Funchess, the court agreed
with the trial court that a killing by stabbing is heinous. In Knight,
a case involving kidnapping for ransom and deaths by shooting,
the court found heinousness based on the infliction of fear: the vic-
tims knew their kidnapper was transporting them to a secluded
263. Id. at 540.
264. 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1978).
265. Id. at 6.
266. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976).
267. 336 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1976).
268. Id. at 1141.
269. 341 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977).
270. 338 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).
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area where they would meet their deathsY.27  Thus, the court in
most of the cases has emphasized the torturous nature of the mode
of killing or the additional acts or has focused on the cold calcula-
tion of the killing, as in Alvord.2
Another series of cases, however, has restricted and qualified
the use of the heinousness factor. In Tedder v. State,275 the appel-
lant shot his mother-in-law to death with a shotgun and left her to
die while he abducted his wife and child from the scene. The trial
court invoked the aggravating factor of heinousness. In rejecting
aggravation of the crime on this basis, the court said:
271. In Knight there was arguably some overlap because the appellant committed the
murders in the course of kidnapping and to avoid detection and arrest. One who embarks on
a course of kidnapping for ransom and who abducts the victim to a secluded place for killing
has arguably not done anything unnecessarily torturous, in the sense of taking delight in
the victim's suffering.
The court found heinousness in a bludgeoning death in Gardner v. State, 313 So. 2d 675
(Fla. 1975), rev'd sub nor. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). In Spenkelink v. State,
313 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1976), the capital felony was an
ordinary shooting death, but the court may have based its approval of a heinousness finding
on the perpetrator's motive to eliminate his travelling companion. The court approved with-
out discussion a heinousness finding based on death by stabbing in Proffitt v. State, 315 So.
2d 461 (Fla. 1975), af'd, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). In Swan v. State, 322 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1975),
where the appellant committed murder by beating, binding and gagging the victim, the jury
nevertheless recommended life. The supreme court reversed the death sentence imposed by
the judge, but did not discuss the factors, saying merely: "Having considered the total re-
cord, we are of the opinion that there were insufficient aggravating circumstances to justify
the imposition of the death penalty. We think the court should have followed the jury's
recommendation for punishment." Id. at 489. In Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976), the appellant bludgeoned and shot the victim to death,
but the court apparently found heinousness because the appellant abducted and forced the
victim and his wife to engage in sex. In Henry v. State, 328 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 951 (1977), the appellant beat the victim, cut his throat, and suffocated
him to death with a gag. The trial court also emphasized that appellant shot an officer
attempting to arrest him several days later. The supreme court affirmed the sentence with-
out discussing the issue of heinousness.
In Hoy v. State, 353 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 920 (1978), both
perpetrators raped one of the victims and then shot her and her male companion to death.
The trial court emphasized the rape in the presence of the boy and his murder in the pres-
ence of the girl, who must have known that her fate too would be death. On appeal, the
court quoted the heinousness definition from Dixon and concluded that the additional acts
set the capital felonies apart from the norm. See also Thompson v. State, 328 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1976), where the defendant entered the victim's business unarmed and stabbed the victim
to death in the course of a robbery attempt. The supreme court reduced the trial court's
death sentence to life, the penalty recommended by the jury. Two justices would have held
the stabbing murder heinous because "a shot may be fired in a sudden outburst of emotion
or because of a 'hair trigger' but the use of a knife necessitates a period of cold calculation."
Id. at 5 (Adkins, C.J., & Roberts, J., concurring specially).
272. 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976).
273. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
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It is apparent that all killings are atrocious, and that appel-
lant exhibited cruelty, by any standard of decency, in allowing
his injured victim to languish without assistance or the ability to
obtain assistance. Still, we believe that the Legislature intended
something "especially" heinous, atrocious or cruel when it au-
thorized the death penalty for first degree murder.2"4
In Halliwell v. State,75 the jury recommended and the trial
judge imposed the death sentence for a bludgeoning death brought
on by a "violent rage" in the context of a love triangle. The su-
preme court ordered the sentence reduced to life, finding "nothing
more shocking in the actual killing than in a majority of murder
cases reviewed by this court. ' M7 Thus, bludgeoning, in itself, is not
a heinous way of killing.2 7 The court suspected that the defen-
dant's dismemberment of the victim's body several hours after the
murder had influenced the jury's recommendation. This fact, the
court held, did not support a finding of heinousness. 78
Even where the mode of killing is unmistakably "torturous"
and set apart from the norm of premeditated murders, the aggra-
vating factor may be offset by mitigating factors that directly re-
late to the heinousness itself. When the jury recommends life and
some basis for the recommendation is recited in the trial court's
findings or appears in the record, the supreme court will reduce a
death sentence to life imprisonment, at least where only a finding
of heinousness supports a death sentence. For example, in Jones v.
State,2 7 9 the appellant killed the victim in a frenzied attack of
stabbing in the course of a rape. The jury recommended life, but
the judge ordered the death penalty. The record contained evi-
dence showing "paranoid psychosis," and the court concluded that
274. Id. at 910 (footnote omitted).
275. 323 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1975).
276. Id. at 561.
277. But see Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878
(1977) (beating with a fire poker past the point of submission until the victim's body was
grossly mangled is heinous).
278. The court found mitigating factors in the record and reduced the penalty:
In mitigation the record shows no prior arrests and that Appellant was a
highly decorated Green Beret in Special Forces in the Vietnam war. Police of-
ficers testified he was under emotional strain over the mistreatment of Sandra
by the victim and that Appellant was greatly influenced by her. There is testi-
mony that she had attempted suicide, that she rushed to him previously for help
in marital conflicts, and that he cancelled diving instruction trips when she was
in trouble.
323 So. 2d at 561.
279. 332 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1976).
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the appellant's capacity to control his actions at the time of the
crime was "not fully known." The court held that the trial judge
should have followed the recommendation of the jury. Similarly, in
Chambers v. State,5 0 the jury recommended life imprisonment as
the penalty for a death inflicted by beating. The trial court recited
the evidence of appellant's long history of drug abuse and emo-
tional disturbance, but concluded that insufficient mitigation had
been established to outweigh the heinous nature of the crime. The
supreme court, however, held that the jury recommendation should
have been followed."'
In Huckaby v. State,282 the jury recommended death for the
capital felony of sexual battery upon a child. The trial court found
heinousness, based on the appellant's behavior toward the victim,
his daughter, and his other children over time. The supreme court
said that "the record . . . bespeaks cruelty enough to his children
to sustain the judge's finding. 2823 But the record also showed that
the appellant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct and to conform his conduct to the law were substantially im-
paired, that the trial court should have considered these factors,
and that death was inappropriate. The court concluded:
Our decision here is based on the causal relationship between
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. The heinous and
atrocious manner in which this crime was perpetrated, and the
harm to which the members of Huckaby's family were exposed,
were the direct consequence of his mental illness, so far as the
280. 339 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1976).
281. Id. at 207-08. A concurring opinion offered further explanation for the decision:
On the record before us, it does not appear that the jury struck an impas-
sioned and unreasoned balance when it recommended life imprisonment. Our
death penalty statute lists as mitigating circumstances the fact that a defendant
"was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance", as to
which there was conflicting evidence, and the fact that the victim consented to
the act causing death. The jury had evidence in abundance that appellant and
Connie Weeks had voluntarily shared a long-standing sado-masochistic relation-
ship which included severe and disabling beatings. They also knew that Connie
Weeks had herself obtained appellant's release from jail on the very day he had
beaten and dragged her through the streets in an unholy rage. In light of the
Legislature's enumeration of the factors to be weighed before effecting state ex-
ecutions, the facts suggesting a sentence of death in this case are not so clear
and convincing that reasonable people could not believe life imprisonment
justified.
Id. at 209 (England, J., joined by Adkins & Sundberg, JJ., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
282. 343 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977).
283. Id. at 33.
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record reveals.2 8 4
Thus, the heinousness itself strongly suggested a mitigating
circumstance.8 5
Recent constructions and applications of the statute regarding
heinousness have in general followed those in the earlier cases.
Thus, the defendant's acts must fall into one of three types of hei-
nousness as delineated by the court before this aggravating circum-
stance may be found: (1) "torturous" nature of the mode of killing,
(2) "additional acts" separate from the actual killing which inflict
suffering, including mental anguish, on the victim, or (3) the grave
culpability or "shockingly evil" nature of acts such as an "execu-
tion" killing. As with the earlier cases, heinousness has been estab-
lished in cases of death by stabbing,2 a8 beating or bludgeoning,2 8 7
strangling,"' and other bizarre modes involving torture.2 8 9 The
court has also held that an ordinary shooting death is not a hei-
nous murder,2 90 even when it is of the "execution" type,291 unless
the shooting is repeated, the death is not instantaneous, or the vic-
tim is finished off while begging for life.292
In a number of cases, the court has held that a capital felony
constituted the "additional acts" necessary to set the crime apart
284. Id. at 34.
285. In another case where the very heinousness of the crime apparently prompted con-
sideration of mitigating factors, the defendant stabbed the victim 35 times in the course of a
rape. The supreme court reduced the sentence to life, the penalty recommended by the
judge. Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1977).
286. Rutledge v. State, 374 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1979) (two counts of murder by stabbing;
jury recommended death; death affirmed); Foster v. State, 369 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1979) (throat
and spine cut; jury recommended death; death affirmed); Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d
658 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979) (three murders by stabbing; jury recom-
mendation waived; death affirmed).
287. Stone v. State, 378 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1979) (bludgeoning; jury recommended death;
death affirmed); Dobbert v. State, 375 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1979) (child beaten to death; death
affirmed); Salvatore v. State, 366 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1978) (bludgeoning death for hire; jury
recommended death; death affirmed); Goode v. State, 365 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1978) (sexual
battery and murder by beating 10-year-old child; jury recommended death; death sentence
affirmed).
288. Jackson v. State, 366 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1978) (strangling and shooting death is hei-
nous; jury recommended death; death affirmed).
289. Smith v. State, 365 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1978) (victim beaten, stabbed with ice pick,
incinerated alive in auto trunk; jury recommended death; death affirmed).
290. Lewis v. State, 377 So. 2d 640 (1979) (jury recommended death; sentence vacated,
remanded for resentencing); Kampff v. State, 371 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1979) (jury recom-
mended death; sentence reduced to life).
291. Menendez v. State, 368 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1979) (nothing to set the crime apart;
jury recommended death; sentence vacated, remanded for resentencing).
292. Lucas v. State, 376 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1979) (lovers' quarrel that escalated to vio-
lence; jury recommended death; sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing).
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from other similar ones. The Dobbert case 2 3 involved a history of
severe child abuse, though the actual killing itself was heinous
enough. A "campaign of terror" aggravated the ordinary shotgun
slaying of the appellant's former wife in Harvard v. State.294 Sex-
ual battery of a wife while her husband lay dying rendered heinous
the shooting death of the husband in Thomas v. State.2s The in-
fliction of mental anguish on the kidnap victim who was later
killed provided additional aggravation in Washington.2 e Yet the
court found nothing to set the crimes apart from the norm in Shue
v. State,2 97 even though the appellant had sexually battered the
two young victims in the presence of one another. The court re-
jected as an aggravating factor the mental anguish caused by
shooting a father in the presence of his son in Riley v. State.25
The court did not discuss the mode of killing in upholding a
finding of heinousness for the rape and murder of a nine-year-old
girl in LeDuc v. State.299 The court in Hargrave v. States "° ap-
proved a finding of heinousness because "the appellant in a calcu-
lated fashion 'executed' the victim to avoid later identification. '"8 01
The court vacated a death sentence in Menendez,30 2 where the
same kind of circumstance was indicated but not clearly estab-
lished.
In Ford v. State,08 a new twist developed on the issue of hei-
nousness. In the course of a robbery getaway, the appellant shot
and killed a police officer whom he had already disabled with two
shots. The court found the killing "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" under the statute because the appellant had shot the officer
again "when he posed no danger to Ford's escape and was in fact
293. Dobbert v. State, 375 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1979).
294. 375 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 956 (1979). Although decided in
1977, the opinion in Harvard was not published until November 1979, when the court re-
manded the case for resentencing because the previous sentencing procedure violated Gard-
ner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 348 (1977).
295. 374 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1979) (jury recommended death; death affirmed).
296. 362 So. 2d 658, 665 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979).
297. 366 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1978) (trial court imposed death sentence although jury rec-
ommended life imprisonment; sentence reduced to life on appeal). The defendant appar-
ently committed the capital felonies (sexual battery on two girls eleven years of age or
younger) with a minimum of force and injury to the victims.
298. 366 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1979).
299. 365 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1978).
300. 366 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1979).
301. Id. at 5.
302. Menendez v. State, 368 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1979).
303. 374 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1979).
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trying to cooperate with the armed appellant."304
The court had held in Coopers8" that a shooting which causes
instantaneous death is not heinous, as a matter of law. In Rauler-
son v. State,306 death also was instantaneous, but the court ap-
proved the finding of heinousness because of the totality of circum-
stances. In the course of a restaurant robbery, the appellant
sexually battered one of the employees while his accomplice held a
number of others at gunpoint. When police officers arrived, appel-
lant shot two of them, killing one. Responding to his contention
that heinousness was not established, the court said:
Defendant ... says that the homicide was not heinous or cruel
because it was accomplished by a pistol shot causing immediate
death. This crime was committed during the course of a robbery
and immediately after a rape. There were many shots fired and
the deceased was well aware that his life was in danger from the
moment he entered the restaurant. This was not a sudden at-
tack, but was part of a general robbery scheme. 07
Thus, the court drew upon the surrounding circumstances and the
officer's awareness that his life was in danger to uphold the trial
court's finding of heinousness.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has described the capital sentencing process in
Florida. The approach has been empirical, looking at the principles
developed in the cases decided since the reintroduction of capital
punishment. An examination of these cases reveals the great diffi-
culty of the tasks assigned to juries, trial judges, and the supreme
court. Definite standards of culpability, as Justice Harlan wrote in
McGautha v. California,80 8 are difficult if not impossible to fash-
ion. Therefore, the people through their legislature have chosen to
place their trust in a process. The step-by-step procedure by which
offenders are selected for the extreme sanction has numerous safe-
guards and numerous occasions for the exercise of discretion. The
process is guided and principled enough so that it does not violate
fundamental law. But whether it selects those offenders whose exe-
cution will most fulfill the purposes of capital punishment is a
304. Id. at 503.
305. Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1976).
306. 358 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1978).
307. Id. at 834.
308. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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question the people will have to decide as the application of the
law proceeds.
